

Argentina Economic Outlook

March 2024

Main messages



Recent developments



Tight monetary conditions have hit the manufacturing sector, but services remain resilient, mainly in the US. The latter has prevented a faster disinflation, which together with geopolitical risks, have kept central banks cautious. Markets have scaled back aggressive monetary easing expectations, but financial volatility remains limited.



Inflation and rates outlook



Inflation is expected to slow further moving ahead, as service pressures are likely to subside, assuming no new supply shocks emerge. That would set the conditions for the Fed and the ECB to gradually cut rates from the middle of this year onwards.



Growth outlook



Growth is likely to lose steam in the US, and to remain relatively weak in the Eurozone and China over the next few quarters. Some recovery is forecast from the second half of the year, driven by lower inflation and lower interest rates, but not in China, where structural deceleration factors are expected to prevail.



Structural factors



Geopolitics will significantly influence future economic dynamics, molding policies and global conflicts. It will potentially increase uncertainty and trigger supply shocks. Combined with other factors, such as demographics and fiscal policy, these shocks will pressure inflation, compelling central banks to keep policy interest rates above pre-COVID levels.

Key points. Argentina



Political outlook



Three months into Javier Milei's government, society maintains support for the executive branch, while the government begins to face political obstacles to pass laws in the Congress.



Exchange market



The new administration increased the FX rate by 120% in Dec-23 and then maintained a crawling peg of 2% per month. We estimate further acceleration ahead given the loss of competitiveness against high inflation, and then a return to below-inflation monthly devaluations as part of a stabilization plan, reaching ARS/USD 1,500 in Dec-24.



Inflation



Monthly inflation is slowing down but will remain elevated until the middle of the year due to high price inertia, the processing of December's FX rate jump and the ongoing correction of relative prices. We are going through the most acute phase of the inflationary process, which will continue to decelerate due to the combination of the fiscal anchor, monetary astringency and, in 2Q24, the effects of the stabilization plan, to accumulate an increase of 175% for the year.



Economic activity



Economic activity will remain in negative territory during the first half of 2024 as it captures the recessionary effects of the relative price correction and high inflation. We project that GDP will fall 4% in 2024 and rebound 6% in 2025, assuming that the stabilization plan to be implemented by the government will be relatively successful.

Key points. Argentina



Fiscal balance



Promising start to the 2024 fiscal year, with the largest January primary surplus in the last 16 years. When looking at the dynamics of expenditure, the strong reduction in real terms of pensions and salaries stands out, which marks the need to move forward on more structural reforms to make these results sustainable.



Monetary sector



The sharp contraction in expenditure and a change in the composition of the BCRA's balance sheet allowed for a marked slowdown in monetary assistance to the Treasury. At the same time, the downward trend in inflation, together with the calm of the foreign exchange market, allowed for postponing of the MPR increase.



External sector



The sharp contraction of economic activity and the depreciated FX are generating substantial trade surpluses, that also reflect the recovery of the agricultural sector (although less than expected in the previous quarter) and the positive contribution, after several years, of the energy sector.

01

Global economic outlook

March 2024

Supply normalization and (surprisingly slow) demand weakening amid high interest rates have triggered an (incomplete) easing of growth and inflation



Main scenario drivers

Waning supply shocks: easing of commodity prices and bottlenecks, despite geopolitical tensions

Demand moderation, on monetary tightness, but backed by fiscal policy and labor markets



Recent macro trends

Declining inflation, which is still above targets, mostly on service pressures

Growth soft-landing: manufacturing weakness, but resilience services



Central banks and financial markets


Rate-hiking cycles seem over; focus on timing and speed of coming easing cycles

Limited financial volatility, despite the scaling back of sharp monetary easing expectations

Global outlook: weak growth will lead to an extra easing of inflation and rate cuts from mid-2024; still, price pressures and interest rates will remain relatively high

BBVA RESEARCH BASELINE SCENARIO: GDP GROWTH, INFLATION AND POLICY INTEREST RATES (*)(**)

(GDP GROWTH: %, INFLATION: YOY %, EOP, POLICY INTEREST RATES: %, EOP)



(*) Global GDP growth: 3.1% (+0.1pp in comparison to previous estimation), 3.1% (+0.1pp) in 2024 in 2024 and 3.3% (+0.0) in 2025.


(**) In the case of the Eurozone, interest rates on refinancing operations.

Source: BBVA Research.

U.S.: demand strength supports a higher growth in 2024, but a moderation is still likely ahead, which would allow a cautious Fed to cut rates from mid-year

U.S.: GDP GROWTH

(%)



- Internal demand and service inflation remains resilient, but further easing is likely on excess savings depletion and tight monetary conditions.
- Extra inflation moderation (forecasts remain broadly unchanged) would pave the way for a monetary easing from May/24, which would take rates to 4.50% in Dec/24 and 3.0% in Dec/25, supporting a growth recovery from late this year.
- A growth acceleration that jeopardizes the inflation convergence to 2% and keeps rates higher is possible, but not very likely; anyway, risks are balanced and a sharper decline of growth and inflation is also a possibility.
- Risks: presidential elections, recession or financial stress on high rates, expansive fiscal stance.


(f): forecast.

Source: BBVA Research.

Eurozone: weak growth and declining inflation favor cautious cuts of ECB policy rates from Jun/24, which would then favor a mild recovery ahead

EUROZONE: GDP GROWTH

(%)




(f): forecast.
Source: BBVA Research.

- **Growth:** stagnation (no recession) in 2023 and beginning of 2024; cross-country divergence.
- **A recovery is likely from mid-year**, but 2025 GDP forecast was cut on prospects of larger fiscal consolidation given the new fiscal rules.
- **Inflation forecasts revised down on incoming data and lower energy prices**, despite service inflation and wage dynamism.
- **Policy rates:** 75 bps cuts this year and 100 bps cuts in the next one are expected.
- **Quantitative tightening** will continue, mainly through a reduction of the PEPP portfolio; new operational framework by 2Q24.
- **Risks:** geopolitical tensions, stagflation and sovereign debt tensions.

China: targeted fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies are likely to sustain growth, but will not prevent a structural slowdown of GDP growth

CHINA: GDP GROWTH

(%)



(f): forecast.


Source: BBVA Research.

- Activity, in particular the troubling real estate sector, will be backed by monetary and fiscal measures and some regulatory easing.
- Fiscal policy is expected to remain expansionary and more cuts in reserve requirements and policy rates are likely after the Fed starts reducing rates.
- A structural growth slowdown is likely on real estate problems, local government debt, ageing, US relationship...
- Inflation remains below zero, but is forecast to converge to 2% on supportive policies, pork price normalization, confidence improvement.
- Risks: real estate tensions, deflation, balance-sheet recession, weak FDI and financial inflows, geopolitical tensions.

Over the next few years, geopolitics and other factors will likely help to keep inflationary pressures and interest rates higher than in the pre-COVID period

NOMINAL POLICY INTEREST RATES (*)

(%)



(*) In the case of the Eurozone, interest rates on refinancing operations.
Source: BBVA Research based on data from the BLS and Eurostat.









- **Geopolitics** will be a source of uncertainty, supply shocks and price pressures:
 - **conflicts** in Ukraine and Middle-East, and potentially in other regions: pressure on energy and other input prices;
 - **lack of coordination** on key global issues: protectionism, climate policies, etc..
- **Other factors** potentially fueling inflation:
 - **elections in the US** and other regions (tariff increases, migration policies, etc.);
 - **extreme weather events**, climate policies;
 - **tight labor markets**, adverse demographics;
 - **fiscal policy**: strong spending (defense, green, social...); high public debt levels.
- **Productivity gains** could, at least partially, weaken inflationary pressures.

02


Argentina Economic Outlook March 2024

Javier Milei began his term in December last year, highlighting the need for urgent solutions in a very fragile economy...


SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS: 2023



...and laid out an ambitious agenda of reforms to deregulate the economy, which soon met resistance in Congress and the Judiciary branch



These setbacks are not surprising given his limited control of seats in the Legislative Branch



Milei's victory as President was essentially personal, not partisan, which is why he has little representation in both Houses. Although he has the support of the majority of the PRO ("hard wing" of Juntos por el Cambio), it is not enough for him to get through parliamentary debate without inconveniences or ongoing negotiations.

As a consequence, at the official annual commencement of the sessions of parliament, Milei called on political leaders to sign a "May Pact"


POINTS OF THE CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

- 1 Inviolability of private property 
- 2 Fiscal equilibrium 
- 3 Reduced public expenditure 
- 4 Tax reform to reduce the tax burden 
- 5 Rediscussion of federal tax sharing 
- 6 Progress in exploitation of natural resources 
- 7 Modern labor reform 
- 8 Sustainable pension reform 
- 9 Structural policy reform 
- 10 Opening up to international trade 

- On March 1, the President inaugurated the ordinary sessions of the National Congress with a scathing speech before the Legislative Assembly against politicians, journalists, and trade unionists (who he calls "the caste") and ended by calling for the signing of an agreement on May 25, the date of commemoration of the first national government.
- The "May Pact" consists of a series of points upon which Milei calls for establishing "a new Argentine economic order" and rebuilding the country's foundations. However, this agreement is contingent upon Congress revising and approving the "Omnibus Law".


At the same time, Milei is battling society's greatest and most urgent concern: inflation

GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDICES (100 = HISTORICAL AVERAGE)



Source: Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and BBVA Research.

PEOPLE'S MAIN CONCERNS (SURVEY CONDUCTED FEBRUARY 9-13 2024; IN %)




Source: Synopsis and BBVA Research.

The "Omnibus Law" bill, with its 664 articles, attacked so many diverse interests that it was unlikely to be passed just as it had been submitted. However, as inflation is the biggest concern among Argentines, Milei uses the tools that allow him to bypass parliament to cater to his constituents and maintain his approval rating.


His first measures seek to clean up the fiscal, monetary and exchange rate imbalances, with correct diagnosis that their solution cannot be postponed

NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (IN MILLIONS OF USD)



Source: IMF, BCRA and BBVA Research.


MONETARY ISSUANCE TO ASSIST THE TREASURY NET OF BOND REPURCHASES FROM THE CENTRAL BANK (IN TRILLIONS OF ARS; CUMULATIVE SINCE JAN-23)



Source: Ministry of Economy, BCRA and BBVA Research.


Thus, the Government made a significant fiscal adjustment and achieved a positive start to fiscal year 2024 with a primary fiscal surplus in January...

TOTAL REVENUE AND PRIMARY EXPENDITURE (CHG. % YOY IN REAL TERMS)



Source: Ministry of Economy and BBVA Research.

FISCAL BALANCES IN THE MONTH OF JANUARY (% GDP)




Source: Ministry of Economy and BBVA Research.

The withdrawal of the "Omnibus Law" did not allow for a greater improvement in revenues, which considered an additional collection of approximately 1% of GDP. Additionally, the economic downturn further moderates fiscal consolidation. In any event, the reduction in expenditures was sharp and resulted in the largest January fiscal surplus since 2008.

...but that it is largely due to the real drop in social assistance, pensions and wages, and it will require additional measures to make it sustainable

JANUARY 2024 TOTAL EXPENDITURES


(ANNUAL % CHG. IN REAL TERMS; INCIDENCE IN %)



Source: Ministry of Economy and BBVA Research.

PROJECTED FISCAL BALANCE

(% GDP)




Source: BBVA Research and the Ministry of Economy.

We maintain our forecast of -0.8% primary fiscal result for 2024, in view of the limits to revenue growth and the limited room for further cuts like those made, given the delicate socio-economic situation.

December's exchange rate correction and the staggering of import payments have been key to strengthening international reserves...

EXCHANGE RATE: OFFICIAL VS. PARALLEL


(ARS/USD; AT TODAY'S PRICES)



Source: BCRA, Haver and BBVA Research.

NET BCRA FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRADING ON THE EXCHANGE MARKET

(IN MILLIONS OF USD)




Source: BCRA and BBVA Research.

The sharp rise in the FX rate made by the government at the beginning of its administration (120%), took pressure off the foreign exchange market, together with the BCRA's decision to issue bonds for importers (BOPREAL) in order to clear the stock of commercial debt contracted by companies during the previous administration, allowing international reserves to be rebuilt.


...but in order to sustain competitiveness, the Central Bank will have to accelerate the current 2% monthly crawling peg pace

REAL EXCHANGE RATE (RER) AND FORECASTS (ARS/USD; AT TODAY'S PRICES)



Source: BCRA, Alphacast and BBVA Research.

INFLATION, MONETARY POLICY RATE (MPR) AND EXCHANGE RATE CHANGE (CHG. % MOM)




Source: BCRA, INDEC and BBVA Research.

With inflation hovering around 20% MOM and an FX rate rising only 2% MOM, exchange rate competitiveness is rapidly eroding in real terms. We expect an acceleration of devaluation starting in March and primarily at the beginning of 2Q24, which could be the starting point for launching a more comprehensive stabilization plan to combat inflation.


The government also undertook a process of "cleaning up" the BCRA's balance sheet, accumulating reserves...

BCRA'S NET PURCHASE OF USD AND BOPREAL STOCK (USD MILLIONS; CUM. AS OF DEC. 11, 2023)



Source: BCRA and BBVA Research.

MONETARY ISSUANCE THROUGH USD PURCHASE AND ABSORPTION VIA BOPREAL (IN TRILLIONS OF ARS; CUMULATIVE AS OF DEC. 11, 2023)




Source: BCRA and BBVA Research.

The BCRA has already bought USD 8.5 billion in the foreign exchange market since Milei took over (net sales to the public sector). The monetary issuance for this item is practically proportional to the monetary absorption resulting from the BOPREAL tender by the importers, so the overall monetary effect has so far been neutral.


...and buying back Treasury bonds in the BCRA's portfolio to reduce the amount of money circulating in the economy

PUBLIC DEBT MATURITY PROFILE IN PESOS AND TREASURY TENDERS (TRILLIONS OF ARS)



Source: Ministry of Economy and BBVA Research.

MONETARY IMPACT OF THE TREASURY BOND BUYBACK VS. PURCHASE OF BCRA BONDS ON SECONDARY MARKET & PUTS (TRILL. OF ARS; CUMULATIVE EFFECT AS OF DEC. 11, 2023)




Source: BCRA and BBVA Research.

In the last three months, the Treasury has raised a significant surplus of pesos over their maturities through auctions of CER bonds. With the extra funds, it bought back debt held by the BCRA, thus withdrawing more than \$8 trillion from circulation. Subtracting the monetary expansion from the exercise of PUTs and BCRA purchases in the secondary market, the net contractionary effect was \$3.5 trillion.


Inflation is accelerating due to FX rate correction and utility prices, outpacing the interest rate, but we expect both variables to align again in 2Q24

INFLATION BY COMPONENT (CHG. % YOY)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

INFLATION AND MONTHLY EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE (CHG. % MOM)




Source: BCRA, INDEC and BBVA Research.

In view of a lax monetary policy, the correction of the FX rate and the adjustment of administered prices, inflation should reach 175% in 2024, with figures remaining high until the middle of the year but slowing down thereafter. The fiscal consolidation and the monetary contraction, in a context of strong recession, would not leave much room for an accelerating inflation.


Economic activity is already showing clear signs of a substantial decline, so the recession will help to control the escalation of inflation

RETAIL SALES, BBVA CARD SPENDING AND AUTOMOBILE SALES (VAR. % YOY REAL)



Source: INDEC, CAME, ADEFA and BBVA Research.

ACTIVITY, INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT & CONSTRUCTION (CHG. % YOY)




Source: OJF & Asociados, INDEC and BBVA Research.

On both the supply and demand sides, economic activity is showing signs of contraction and will remain in negative territory, at least for 1H24. Retail and BBVA card consumption plummeted, with drops comparable to those of the 2020 quarantine, as shown by official data on industry and construction.

As a consequence, we expect GDP to fall 4% in 2024 and rebound 6% in 2025, assuming the stabilization plan proves successful...

ANNUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH


(CHG. % YOY; CONSTANT ARS)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

GDP FORECAST BY COMPONENT

(CHG. % YOY; CONSTANT ARS)




Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

The drop in real wages and the fiscal adjustment will hurt total consumption in 2024. High inflation postpones business investments until stabilization is achieved. Exports will grow significantly due to the normalization of the harvest and an improvement in the energy balance. Imports will fall but then reactivate to keep up with growth.

...not to mention the high costs it has in an economy with a delicate social situation and a very precarious labor market

UNEMPLOYMENT AND REAL WAGE


(RATE IN %; BASE SALARY 2014=100)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

REAL WAGES BY SECTOR


(PRICES AS OF DEC. 2017)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

REAL ANNUAL WAGE BY SECTOR

(CHG. % YOY CUMULATIVE)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

The purchasing power of the total wage bill plummeted in 2023, significantly harming the informal sectors. As a result, poverty (around 50%) and indigence (approximately 12%) increased. The government's fiscal tightening and relative price adjustment will make 2024 another recessionary year.

But what does the stabilization plan consist of?



This is a **large-scale adjustment of macroeconomic policy** (Central Bank and Treasury) with the **explicit aim of lowering inflation** from high levels.

The explicitly announced package of measures must be **comprehensive**, technically **feasible** and **credible** in order to influence the expectations of the players.

The rest of the economic **policies are subordinated to the objective of disinflation.**

It includes measures on these fronts (including the definition of an anchor):

MONETARY POLICY

Interest rates, monetary aggregates, institutionality of the Central Bank, etc.

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

Floating or fixing the exchange rate, capital controls, macroprudential measures, etc.

FISCAL POLICY


Reducing the fiscal dominance of monetary policy, ensuring the sustainability of the macroeconomic scheme.

REVENUE POLICY

Price controls, wage controls, etc. (if "heterodox", unlikely under Milei)

The IMF validated Milei's economic program and disbursed USD 4.7 billion, which is enough to cover almost all payments until April

MATURITIES WITH THE IMF (MILLIONS OF USD)




Source: IMF and BBVA Research.

- The primary fiscal surplus target is 2% of GDP by 2024, consistent with a total deficit of 0%, and no net monetary financing from the BCRA to the Treasury, but with a more restrictive definition as it now includes the purchase of bonds in the secondary market, the execution of puts and the transfer of reserves against LI.
- The reserve accumulation target is USD 10 bn (implies 0 net reserves by the end of 2024), which looks achievable.
- The disbursement is enough to cover almost all payments until April, and the new review will take place in May. Disbursements of about USD 1.9 bn remain for the rest of the year and payments of USD 3 bn.

The good news will come from the external accounts: the contribution of the agricultural and energy sectors will make a difference in 2024...

EXPORTS OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR


(IN BILLIONS OF USD)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

ENERGY BALANCE

(IN MILLION OF USD; MOVING SUM 12 MONTHS)




Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

The contribution of agriculture is losing some momentum due to the heat wave that is affecting yields as well as lower prices. But, in any case, the performance of the sector will be much better than in 2023. Meanwhile, in the 12 months ended in January 2024, the energy trade balance registered a surplus of USD 425 million.

...and the contraction of the GDP, together with the depreciation of the exchange rate, will generate a higher trade surplus

TRADE PRICES AND QUANTITIES


(CHG. % YOY)



Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

FOREIGN TRADE

(IN MILLIONS OF USD)




Source: INDEC and BBVA Research.

After closing 2023 with a trade deficit of USD 6.92 billion, in 2024, the boost in exported quantities and the contraction in imported quantities will determine a trade balance of USD 15.5 billion, slowing down toward 2025 as economic growth requires increasing imports.

Loans and deposits will shrink in a context of stagflation in 2024, but within a new regulatory environment and lower liquidity surpluses

LOANS AND DEPOSITS IN PESOS AND CREDIT/DEPOSIT RATIO IN PESOS

(LEFT: % GDP; RIGHT : RATIO IN %)



- We expect a **new financial scenario** under Milei's administration: lower liquidity surplus in the system due to the halt in monetary issuance to assist the Treasury, liberalization of rates and credit destinations, simplification of reserve requirements, boost of fintechs and digital banking, undoing the path of financial repression.
- The **exchange rate unification**, a key goal in Milei's agenda, would return the foreign exchange business to the traditional channels, reducing the relevance of the blue chip swap.
- We expect measures to foster the development of capital markets: new instruments, higher trade volumes, the reopening of IPOs, increase of cross-border operations, among others.

Table of macroeconomic forecasts

	2020	2021	2022	2023e	2024e	2025e
GDP (% YoY)	-9.9	10.7	5.0	-1.5	-4.0	6.0
Inflation (% YoY eop)	36.1	50.9	94.8	211.4	175.0	50.0
Exchange rate (vs USD eop)	84.1	102.8	177.1	808	1500	2108
Monetary Policy Rate (% eop)	37.1	36.7	75.0	100	56	39
Private Consumption (% YoY)	-12.2	10.4	9.7	1.4	-3.7	5.1
Public Consumption (% YoY)	-2.0	6.3	1.9	2.8	-5.7	1.0
Investment (% YoY)	-13.1	33.8	11.1	0.6	0.1	15.5
Primary Fiscal Balance (% GDP)	-6.4	-3.0	-2.4	-2.7	-0.8	0.0
Fiscal Balance (% GDP)	-8.4	-4.5	-4.2	-4.3	-3.0	-2.0
Current Account (BoP, % GDP)	0.7	1.4	-0.7	-3.3	0.8	0.0
Public Debt (% GDP)	103.8	80.6	85.0	148.7	95.3	83.1

Disclaimer

This document has been prepared by BBVA Research Department. It is provided for information purposes only and expresses data, opinions or estimations regarding the date of issue of the report, prepared by BBVA or obtained from or based on sources we consider to be reliable, and have not been independently verified by BBVA. Therefore, BBVA offers no warranty, either express or implicit, regarding its accuracy, integrity or correctness.

Any estimations this document may contain have been undertaken according to generally accepted methodologies and should be considered as forecasts or projections. Results obtained in the past, either positive or negative, are no guarantee of future performance.

This document and its contents are subject to changes without prior notice depending on variables such as the economic context or market fluctuations. BBVA is not responsible for updating these contents or for giving notice of such changes.

BBVA accepts no liability for any loss, direct or indirect, that may result from the use of this document or its contents.

This document and its contents do not constitute an offer, invitation or solicitation to purchase, divest or enter into any interest in financial assets or instruments. Neither shall this document nor its contents form the basis of any contract, commitment or decision of any kind.

With regard to investment in financial assets related to economic variables this document may cover, readers should be aware that under no circumstances should they base their investment decisions on the information contained in this document. Those persons or entities offering investment products to these potential investors are legally required to provide the information needed for them to take an appropriate investment decision.

The content of this document is protected by intellectual property laws. Reproduction, transformation, distribution, public communication, making available, extraction, reuse, forwarding or use of any nature by any means or process is prohibited, except in cases where it is legally permitted or expressly authorised by BBVA on its website www.bbvarresearch.com.

This report has been produced by:

Chief Economist

Marcos Dal Bianco

marcos.dalbiano@bbva.com

Federico Forte

Principal Economist

federico.forte@bbva.com

Adriana Haring

Senior Economist

aharing@bbva.com

Mario Iparraguirre

Economist

mario.iparraguirre@bbva.com

Juan Manuel Manias

Principal Economist

juan.manias@bbva.com

Tomás Triantafilo

Economist

tomasteodoro.triantafilo@bbva.com

Argentina Economic Outlook

March 2024