

Migration Outlook

Mexico

July 2013
Economic Analysis

- Mexico falls from 3rd to 4th place in receipt of remittances, behind China, India and, from 2012 on, the Philippines
- Remittances inflows to Mexico have slowed, but to Central America have grown: this is due to a number of structural and temporary factors
- Between 5.4 and 6.8 million unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the US hope to be have their status regularized through the immigration reform
- Mexico at a new stage in its migration history: The period of incompatibility between US labor demand and Mexican immigrants supply

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1. Summary

Remittances to Mexico are stagnating, while those to Central America continue to recover

For 2012, all Central American countries have already exceeded their level of remittances received in 2007, while Mexico's remittances remain stagnant. A combination of temporary and structural factors has dismayed the recovery of remittances to Mexico. Within these factors are: weakness in employment of Mexican immigrants in the US, and, since 2011, falls in the exchange rate (pesos per dollar); in Central America, however, both factors have either had a favorable impact, or have not reduced the incentives for sending remittances to those countries.

According to World Bank estimates, Mexico has fallen from 3rd to 4th place in receipt of remittances, behind China, India and, from 2012 on, the Philippines

According to the World Bank's estimates for personal remittances at April 2013, which include remittances by workers, remuneration in salaries and other transfers and credits, and which are not only of a family type, in 2012 the Philippines could have obtained remittance income of 24.5 billion dollars, which would relegate Mexico to 4th in the ranking of highest recipient of remittances at global level, where India and China stand in first and second position, respectively.

In 2013, remittances to Mexico are expected to be at levels lower than those registered the previous year

For Mexican immigrants in the United States, employment has just begun to show a slight positive trend, which could continue until the end of the year. This means that remittances, which have been reduced at annual rate month after month in the first half of the year and over the first 5 months have accumulated a fall of over 10%, might report some months with growth, so that they might be expected to close 2013 with year-over-year fall of between -4.7% and -6.7%.

Labor incompatibility of Mexican migration: the new phase of Mexico-United States migration

Before the recent crisis, migratory flows had increased considerably, pushing up the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States year after year over the last two decades until 2007. But after the economic crisis, Mexican migration entered a new phase, shaped by a certain degree of incompatibility between US labor demand and the offer of Mexican immigrants. Over the last two decades, and in a more pronounced way since 2007, there has been a trend of greater demand in the US for employment towards highly skilled workers. However, the supply of labor by Mexican immigrants has not been able to adapt to the speed at which these changes have occurred in demand. In 1995, 75% of Mexican immigrants employed in US had no more than 12 years of schooling; while by 2012, this proportion had only fallen to 73%. In this new phase of Mexican migration to the US, there are lower migratory flows, lower entry of undocumented immigrants into the US, and an increase in the proportion of new documented and more highly skilled Mexican immigrants.

What does the current immigration reform in the US consist of?

The current immigration reform being discussed in the US has four main pillars: 1) It would open a long way in which unauthorized immigrants residing in the US would be able to start, almost immediately, by regularizing their immigration situation with permission to work freely in the US, and subsequently be able to obtain citizenship; 2) More non-immigrant work visas and more facilities to process them, depending on the shortage of labor in the US, as a possible solution to tackle undocumented immigration in the

future; 3) It would strengthen border security, in terms of infrastructure, technological equipment and more security personnel; and 4) It would improve control of immigrants to the interior of the country while more stringent verification systems would be implemented.

How many could benefit from US immigration reform?

Between 11.1 and 11.5 million undocumented immigrants residing in the US, which 5.4 to 6.8 million are Mexican, would be able to obtain the Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status, allowing them to work in any job and to travel outside the US and then return, not being able to be apprehended or deported by migration authorities unless they commit a serious breach of the law. Subsequently, they would be able to apply for Permanent Legal Residence, or Green Card, through a merit-based system, and then apply for citizenship.

According to BBVA Research estimates, over 62% of unauthorized immigrants in the US reside in only six states: California, Texas, New York, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois. Almost three quarters of these immigrants are aged between 20 and 49, which are the most productive working ages; and approximately 56% of them are men and 44% are women. In addition to Mexicans, other large groups of immigrants who would benefit from the reform are those born in: India, El Salvador, China, the Philippines, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, South Korea, Honduras, Colombia, Vietnam, and others.

“Dreamers” and agricultural workers (Blue Card): with preferential treatment in the migration reform

Within the current migration reform bill, two groups would have more favorable conditions. One of them is the “dreamers”, which refers to undocumented immigrants who entered the US as children (15 year or less) with a university or associate degree, or who have earned a high-school diploma and served in the Uniformed Services for at least four years. The second group refers to the agricultural workers who have worked continuously in agriculture over the previous two years, who will be granted the Blue Card status on the condition that they continue working in agricultural activities in the US. Both groups, if they comply with the requirements, would be entitled to apply for Lawful Permanent Residence or the Green Card in 5 years, and then apply for citizenship.

BBVA Research figures indicate that approximately 1.5 million unauthorized immigrants can aspire to be “dreamers”, 800 thousand of which are Mexican; while 180 thousand agricultural workers might be able to obtain the Blue Card status, 160 thousand of whom were born in Mexico.

Could there be fewer undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US than estimated ?

The Department of Homeland Security calculates that of the 11.5 million undocumented immigrants living in the US in 2011, 6.8 million were born in Mexico (59%). This figure, however, is not consistent with other estimates and sources of information. If the following figures or estimates - naturalized (2.77 million), US citizens born in Mexico (0.29 million), Green Card holders (3.32 million), and non-immigrant Mexicans such as temporary workers, transfers between companies, students, teachers, diplomats, inter alia (0.28 million) - were subtracted from the 12 million immigrants born in Mexico, then the remainder is very close to the 5.4 million undocumented Mexican immigrants estimated by BBVA Research, which would mean that Mexicans account for only 47% of total undocumented immigrants in the USA. Perhaps this question can only be properly answered once the regularization applications begin to be received, assuming that the immigration reform is approved.

2. Why are remittances to Mexico falling and those to Central America increasing?

A report entitled “Las Remesas a América Latina y el Caribe (ALyC) en 2012” (“Remittances to Latin America and to the Caribbean (LA&C) in 2012”) was recently published by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank. The report indicates that the remittance income received in the region hit its peak level in 2008, reaching 64.9 billion dollars, but due to the effect of the economic crisis in 2009 it slumped by around 13%, while for 2010 and 2011 it improved slightly to reach 60.9 billion in the last year. In 2012, however, growth in remittances stagnated once again. The report pinpoints the performance of Mexico and Central America: the former because it is the Latin American and Caribbean country which receives most remittances and because remittances have recently shown a downturn there, leading to a reduction in the relative role of this income in the region. In fact, from being the world's third ranking largest recipient of remittances in 2012 Mexico slipped to fourth position, being overtaken by the Philippines, which was behind China and India (see the statistical annex). Central America, on the other hand, showed the strongest recovery and is the only region of LA&C which showed growth in remittance income between 2010 and 2012.

This article analyzes what factors might be affecting the performance shown in both regions, which countries are reporting growth in remittances and what could happen in the following years. For Mexico, we provide growth forecasts in remittances for 2013 and 2014.

a. The performance of remittances in Mexico and Central American countries 2003-2012

Within Central America, Guatemala was the second-ranking recipient of remittances until 2004, but from then on it took over the leading position at the expense of El Salvador. These two countries, together with Honduras, account for slightly over 70% of the remittances received by Central America. Other countries receive remittances in the following order: Nicaragua fourth, Panama fifth, Costa Rica sixth, and, lastly, Belize.

Table 1

Remittances received by Mexico and Central America, from 2003 to 2012 (Million dollars)

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Mexico	13,266	16,613	20,034	23,742	26,069	25,145	21,245	21,271	22,731	22,446
Central America	6,671	7,801	9,133	11,140	12,359	12,863	11,701	12,309	13,171	14,031
Guatemala	2,106	2,681	2,993	3,610	4,128	4,315	3,912	4,127	4,377	4,782
El Salvador	2,316	2,548	2,830	3,316	3,695	3,788	3,465	3,540	3,650	3,911
Honduras	862	1,134	1,763	2,359	2,561	2,701	2,483	2,529	2,862	2,894
Nicaragua	788	810	850	950	990	1,000	915	966	1,053	1,152
Panama	220	231	254	292	320	325	291	540	592	601
Costa Rica	306	320	362	520	560	624	535	507	530	579
Belize	73	77	81	93	105	110	100	100	107	112
Total Mexico and Central America	19,937	24,414	29,167	34,882	38,428	38,008	32,946	33,580	35,902	36,477

Source: BBVA Research based on Inter-American Development Bank data


For Mexico and Central American countries, remittances rose significantly in the first years of the twenty-first century, but this trend was halted by the economic crisis. In all cases, lower amounts were received in 2009 than in 2008 and 2007. However, unlike the situation in Mexico, all Central American countries showed an upturn in remittances between 2011 and 2012. Particularly noteworthy is Panama, which showed the fastest recovery, and where in comparison with 2007, remittances for 2010 were 68% higher, and those in 2012 88% higher, despite being one of the countries in the region which receives the lowest remittances. In the post-crisis period, therefore, Panama has experienced a significant increase in this income.

The other Central American countries have performed similarly in the growth of remittances received, although Belize took slightly longer to recover the income received, but in 2011 and 2012 all the Central American countries recorded positive variations, reporting levels higher than those of 2007 in the last year.

Meanwhile, Mexico showed a marginal reduction in remittances in 2010, it grew by almost 7% in 2011 and slumped again in 2012. During 2013, it has reported year-on-year falls in all months for which information is available, so that in the first 5 months of the year it fell back by slightly over 10% in relation to the same period of the previous year. The situation of heavy falls is not evident in Central American countries, given that in those for which monthly information on remittances income is available only El Salvador showed a year-on-year fall of 1.8% in the first quarter of the year. Meanwhile, Honduras and Guatemala reported growths of slightly over 7% in the first four months of 2013.

Graph 1

Remittances income in Mexico and Central America 2003-2012 (Index 2007=100)



Source: BBVA Research based on Inter-American Development Bank data.

* Panamá data is referred on the right axis.

Table 2

Change in remittance income in Mexico and certain Central American countries in 2013

Country	Change	Period
Mexico	-10.3%	First 5 months
El Salvador	-1.8%	First quarter
Honduras	7.1%	First 4 months
Guatemala	7.3%	First 4 months
Nicaragua	4.1%	First 2 months

Source: BBVA Research with information from central banks of each selected country.

The information presented in this section poses a series of questions to which we hope to find answers in the following sections. Why have remittances income to Mexico not grown since mid-2012? Why have they grown in Central American countries? Why have remittances income in Panama increased so heavily? Next, we shall analyze where do remittances received by Mexico and Central America come from, in order to analyze the situation of the countries from which the remittances are sent. From now on Belize shall not be included in the analysis due to the lack of information about this country.

b. Where do the remittances received in Mexico and Central America come from?

According to World Bank data, all these analyzed countries - except Nicaragua - received most of their remittances from the United States in 2012. The US accounted for 69% of the remittances received by Costa Rica, 72% of those for Panama, almost 90% of those for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, and 98% of those sent to Mexico. Nicaragua received its remittances mainly from two countries, Costa Rica, which accounted for 44%, and the United States, which accounted for 43%.

Other countries play a significant role in the remittances received by Central America, though to a much lesser degree than the countries we have mentioned. For example, Costa Rica was the origin of almost 11% of remittances received by Panama. Nicaragua is also a source for remittances to Costa Rica (5% of the total received in 2012). Canada accounted for almost 3% of the remittances sent to Costa Rica, and almost 4% to El Salvador. Mexico was the source for approximately 3% of the remittances received by Guatemala.

Therefore, for most of the countries considered in this analysis, the United States is the most important origin of the remittances.

Table 3

Distribution of remittances according to country of origin, 2012 (%)

		Receiving country						
		Costa Rica	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
S e n d i n g c o u n t r y	Bolivia	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
	Canada	2.8	3.8	2.0	1.0	0.5	1.7	2.3
	Costa Rica	-	0.9	0.3	0.6	-	44.0	10.6
	Mexico	2.24	0.50	3.09	0.70	0.00	0.46	1.51
	Nicaragua	5.0	0.2	0.1	1.5	0.0	-	0.3
	Spain	2.6	0.6	0.7	4.3	0.4	1.7	3.3
	United States	69.1	89.7	89.4	86.8	98.2	42.5	72.1
	Others	18.2	4.4	4.4	5.0	0.8	9.5	9.7
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: BBVA Research based on World Bank data.

c. Factors which may be affecting the performance of remittances to Mexico and Central America

According to literature regarding empirical analysis of the determining factors for remittances (refer to Hagen et. al., 2007) relevant factors include the number of immigrants, their capacity to send resources (income, employment, etc.) and certain macroeconomic factors of the origin and destination countries. Turning our attention to Mexico, in our November 2012 issue of *Mexico Migration Outlook*, we showed that variations in remittances depend to a large degree on employment of Mexican immigrants in the United States and of the changes in exchange rates between Mexico and the United States, and that there are direct relationship between remittances and both variables, where employment is a long term determining factor and the exchange rate is a short term determining factor. Central American countries also appear to show this same relationship. A regression with panel data was estimated including monthly information in the 2005-2012 period for Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (for the other countries, no monthly information is available on the amount of remittances they have received). The dependent variable is remittances (in million dollars) and the explanatory variables are the number of immigrants employed for each country in the United States (considering that in most cases, it is the main country from where remittances are sent), and the monthly variation in exchange rate (in local currency per dollar). The estimate is not intended to be an econometric model of the determining factors for remittances, but shows the direction in which the exchange rate and immigrants' employment affect remittances. The results show that the two variables are directly related

to remittances. With higher levels of employment, immigrants overall will have more resources, and thus more prospects of being able to send remittances. When the exchange rate rises, the remittances will have a greater value when they are converted into the local currency, so there are more incentives for sending them.

Given that the relationship seems to be direct with both variables, this means that when immigrant employment in the US and the exchange rate increase, remittances also tend to increase. In the following sections, we shall analyze what has happened with these variables. Given that in most cases, the US is main country of origin, remittances would be affected by the same macroeconomic factors of the country of origin, so that we can focus on what happens in particular with the immigrants of each one of the selected countries in the United States, and this can help us to explain what happens to the remittances reaching Mexico and Central America.

Table 4

Relationship of immigrant employment and exchange rate with remittances

	Fixed effects			Random effects		
	Coefficient	t-statistic		Coefficient	t-statistic	
Constant	-242.4666	-3.66	***	89.09531	2.48	**
Immigrants employed in the US (millions)	202.701	6.86	***	206.4446	6.86	***
Monthly variation in exchange rate (local currency per dollar)	464.2981	12.39	***	276.0227	25.24	***
Number of observations		426			426	
R ² within		0.3123			0.3123	
R ² between		0.9908			0.9908	
R ² total		0.969			0.969	
Estimate methods according to Hausman test				Random effects		

*** Statistically significant at level of 1% or less, ** statistically significant at level of 5% or less

Note: Includes Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Considering monthly data in the 2005-2012 period


Source: BBVA Research using Current Population Survey data and information from central banks of each country

Immigrant employment in the United States

In the United States, while now a day Central Americans overall have recovered all the employment lost following the crisis and are at their maximum historical values, Mexican immigrants have not yet recovered the employment they lost, and stand below their pre-crisis levels.

Graph 2

Evolution of the employment of immigrants from Mexico and Central America in the United States (January of 2008=100)



Seasonally adjusted figures based on Tramo seats
Source: BBVA Research using Current Population Survey data


However, the employment performance has not been even in all Central American countries. The countries which have clearly exceeded all the employment lost are those with the highest number of immigrants in US: Guatemala and El Salvador.

Panama, Nicaragua and Honduras stand at similar levels of employment they had prior to the economic crisis, while Costa Rica appears to be below the previous levels, although it shows a positive trend. The data are considered to be estimates based on the survey information, so that in cases where there are few observations- such as in Panama and Costa Rica - the estimates may not be reliable.

These results suggest that the higher remittance income in Guatemala and El Salvador may be due to the upturn experienced in employment for immigrants from these countries. Although in the case of El Salvador, its remittance income fell slightly in the first quarter of the current year, probably due to the loss of growth in jobs obtained by its immigrants in recent months.

Graph 3


Evolution of the employment of immigrants from Central America countries in the United States (January of 2008=100)



Seasonally adjusted figures based on Tramo seats
Source: BBVA Research using Current Population Survey data


Differences in employment trends between Mexicans and Central Americans are caused by different factors: 1) In sectors where 75% of jobs were lost in the US following the crisis (construction, manufacturing and trade), the concentration of Mexicans was higher than that of Central Americans (51% as against 45%). 2) Anti-immigration laws had a greater impact on Mexicans, as they represent most of the undocumented immigrants in the United States, and because a high proportion of all Mexicans immigrants are unauthorized, as shown in the following article. Thus, in states in which anti-immigration laws were applied (Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina and Tennessee), there was an outflow of Mexicans but not of Central Americans. 3) In the United States, there has been a trend - one which has become more pronounced following the economic crisis - of higher demand for workers with higher education levels and reduction of those at lower education levels. Although both Mexicans and Central Americans have low education levels, Central Americans have higher levels on average.

Graph 4
United States: Workers employed by level of education (Distribution %)



Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

Graph 5
Proportion of Mexican and Central American immigrants in the US according to level of education, 2012




Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

Exchange rate

As stated above, generally speaking for Mexico and Central American countries the exchange rate (local currency against the dollar) seems to have a direct impact on remittances, in other words when the exchange rate rises remittances tend to have greater value when converted to the local currency, and therefore there are more incentives to send remittances. When the exchange rate falls, the opposite happens. In Central America, certain countries - such as El Salvador and Panama, which are dollarized countries - are affected only very slightly by the exchange rate, but what happens with the other countries, including Mexico?

Generally speaking, Mexico is the country which shows the greatest variations in the exchange rate in the period analyzed. During 2011, the exchange rate increased significantly in the second half of the year, which might have had a certain degree of impact on the growth of 7% in remittances seen that year. 2012 began with a downturn in the first quarter of the year, changing to an upturn until June, and then from July 2012 on a downturn again. This last period also matches with a phase of month after month falls in remittances to Mexico (in annual rate).

Graph 6
Average buying exchange rate (local currency per US\$; January 2012=100)



Source: BBVA Research, with Central-American Monetary Council and Banco de Mexico data

In Costa Rica and Guatemala, the exchange rate has kept relatively stable in recent months, so that remittances might not be affected by this situation. Meanwhile, in Honduras and Nicaragua, the exchange rate has tended to rise, thus creating favorable conditions for sending remittances.


Thus, it is seen that the exchange rate is a factor which appears to be generating differences in the performances of remittances between Mexico and certain Central American countries. While in Mexico this factor seems to have had a negative impact since the second half of 2012 (when remittances began to fall), in Central American countries either it has not had effects or it has been favorable.

Wages

The sending of remittances is not only related to immigrants' desire or willingness to send remittances, but it is highly related to the capacity to do so; and an indicator of this capacity is the income received by immigrants. Generally speaking, wages have remained relatively stable for all countries, except for Panama. The considerable increase seen in remittances to Panama seems to be due to the large increase in wages received on average by Panamanian immigrants in the United States. Panama is a country which receives lower remittances in comparison with other countries included in this analysis, making its base for comparison lower, causing higher increases in the event of positive changes in factors determining remittances. Panama is the Central American country which is furthest from the United States, making its emigration costs higher than in other countries of the region; this means its immigrants in the United States are more likely to be more highly skilled, as they were able to incur higher expenses, and in recent years the immigrants reaching the United States tend to have greater skills, and thus their wages have tended to be higher.

Graph 7

Annual average wage of immigrants in the United States by country of origin




Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

d. Our remittance forecasts for Mexico in 2013 and 2014

In the first months of the year, remittances to Mexico have fallen month after month, and in the first 5 months of the year, they have accumulated a decrease of 10.3%. Looking towards the second half of the year, Mexican immigrants' employment in the United States could improve, while the exchange rate is also expected to strengthen to a certain degree (it has happened over the last few days), so that there might be some improvement in remittances to Mexico. Therefore, accumulated remittances in dollars for 2013, might vary by between -4.7% and -6.7%, which means another year with falls. Towards 2014, there may be a slight improvement in remittance income, due to the effect of the comparison against 2013 and of some degree of recovery in Mexican immigrants' employment, possibly giving a rise in remittances of between 1% and 3% in dollar terms.

Graph 8

Accumulated 12-month remittance inflows to Mexico (Millions of dollars)



Source: BBVA Research with Banxico figures

Table 5

Changes In remittances to Mexico in dollars

Year	2013e	2014e
Estimates remittances inflow (millions)	20,935 a	21,145 a
Year-over-year change (%)	-6.7 a -4.7%	1 a 3%

e: estimates
Source: BBVA Research estimates

e. Final considerations

Within Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America is the area which has shown the greatest upturn in remittance income since 2010. Mexico, on the other hand, which is the most important receiver of remittances in the region, reported growth of almost 7% in 2011, but in 2012 saw a slump in its remittance income, and is very likely to see a further fall in 2013. In both cases, United States is the main source of the remittances. While remittances inflows to Mexico has been affected by the weakness in jobs of Mexican immigrant workers in the US and the fall in the exchange rate (pesos per dollar), in Central America the two factors have either had a favorable impact or have not discouraged the remittances inflows they receive.

The increase observed between 2010 and 2012 in remittances to Guatemala and El Salvador appears to be have been caused by increases in employment of immigrants from these countries in the United States, although in the case of El Salvador the employment situation for this country’s immigrants has worsened in recent months, and this appears to be the reason for the fall in remittances in the first quarter of this year. Panama is the country which has reported the highest growth in remittance income in Central America in recent years, a situation which appears to have been caused by the wages increases for Panamanian immigrants in the US on average; after the economic crisis, there is likely to have been an increase in more highly skilled immigrants from this country.

Although the level of employment of immigrants from Nicaragua and Honduras in the US is close to pre-crisis levels, according to Current Population Survey data, in both cases the upturn in remittances appears to be associated with the rising exchange rate in the two countries in recent years. Costa Rica is the Central American country where remittances grew least until 2012 - the reason appears to be that although its immigrants’ employment in the US has tended to grow in recent years, it is still below its pre-crisis levels, while, importantly, its exchange rate has not grown as it has in other countries.

For Mexican immigrants in the United States, employment has just begun to show a slight positive trend, which could continue. This means that remittances, which have been reduced month after month in annual rate during the first half of the year, and which over the first 5 months have accumulated a fall of over 10%, might report some months with growth, so that we expect that on aggregate they would show a year-over-year rate of between -4.7% and -6.7%.

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3. The US immigration reform. How many and who would benefit?

On April 16th, the “Gang of Eight”¹ released the Senate immigration reform bill with the aim of regularizing over ten million unauthorized immigrants residing in the US, and to establish the new guidelines to be followed by the US government with regard to future immigration and border security. The four pillars of this immigration bill are:

1. Border reinforcement and security,
2. Regularization of undocumented immigrants in the US and a way for them to later obtain citizenship,
3. Interior enforcement and verification systems, and
4. Non-immigrants work visas for jobs with shortages to tackle undocumented immigration in the future.

Recently, on June 27 the US Senate passed the immigration reform bill, with the application of certain amendments intended to increase security on the border with Mexico. The bill was delivered to the United States House of Representatives for its discussion. Once the final version is available, it will be remitted to the plenary sessions of both houses in order to be passed, and then it will be sent to President Obama for him to approve or to veto it.

Who are the main groups of immigrants who would benefit from the immigration reform?

The main groups which could benefit from the immigration reform which is currently discussed in the US House of Representatives are indicated as follows. Data are from the latest public version available of the immigration reform bill approved by the Senate and referred to as “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act”.

Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status

The idea is to assign Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status to persons who are not authorized to reside in the United States. Almost any undocumented person in the United States before the indicated date and who does not have a serious criminal record can obtain RPI status. According to the latest version of the bill, the following persons can apply:

1. Persons who entered US territory on or before December 31, 2011, and have remained physically at the date of application, even if they have a removal order.
2. Spouse or child of someone who has RPI status and entered the US before or until December 31, 2012.
3. Similarly, if the person was deported for non-criminal reasons but resided in the US on or before December 31, 2011, he or she may apply being the spouse, child or parent of any US citizen or permanent resident, providing he/she complies with the established requirements.

¹ Refers to a group of 8 leaders within US Congress. For the immigration reform bill, it was made up of 8 senators, 4 democrats (Chuck Schumer, Michael Bennet, Richard Durbin and Bob Menendez) and 4 republicans (Marco Rubio, John McCain, Jeff Flake and Lindsey Graham).


Aliens who have committed relevant crimes are excluded. Persons complying with the requirements have to pay a fee to begin proceedings, and cover taxes not formerly declared in accordance to what would be established in the reform. Persons with RPI status are assigned an official ID and a Social Security number, they do not have any restrictions to carry out any job, and to travel outside the US and return, and cannot be apprehended or deported by immigration authorities unless they commit a serious violation of any law. However, they are not eligible for certain public assistance programs involving cash transfers.

Initially, the RPI status will last for 6 years, and can be extended for another 6 years. They can apply for Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status or Green Card, via a Merit Based System, where the following are rated: a) Remaining continuously in US territory, b) Having worked or studied regularly in the US, c) Having paid all taxes in the years in which RPI was held, and d) Demonstrating knowledge of the civil system of the US, of its history, and of the English language.

According to estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center (Passel and Cohn, 2012) and from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Hoefer et al., 2012) it is calculated that in 2011 between 11.1 and 11.5 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the US, respectively, the same number of people who will be able to apply for RPI status, provided they comply with the established requirements.

Graph 9


Estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center of the undocumented immigrant population in the US, 2000-2011 (Millions)



Source: BBVA Research using data of Passel and Cohn (2011 and 2012)

Graph 10

Estimates by the Department of Homeland Security of the undocumented immigrant population in the US, 2000-2011 (Millions)



Source: BBVA Research using data of Hoefer et al. (2011 and 2012)

From these same estimates, it is calculated that between 6.5 and 6.8 million unauthorized immigrants in the US were born in Mexico, a number that is equivalent to 58% or 59% of the total number of unauthorized immigrants in the US. Our own estimates below indicate that the volume of unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the US is less, although it is still a considerable number, almost 5.4 million (close to 47% of total number of undocumented immigrants).

So the following question arises: Could the numbers of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US be overestimated? A simple exercise, using certain data presented in the table below, shows that the real figure is more likely to be that estimated by BBVA Research, even considering a possible undercount in the Current Population Survey (CPS). As we can see, the remainder, which would correspond to the volume of undocumented Mexican immigrants residing in the US, ranges between 4.8 and 5.3 million.

Table 6

Simplified residual estimate of unauthorized immigrant population born in Mexico residing in the US, 2011

Data	Source	Unauthorized Mexican immigrants residing in the USA	
		Low estimate	High estimate
Total Mexican immigrants in the US	Passel et al. (2012b), estimate that in 2011 there were 12.0 million Mexican immigrants in the US Data from CPS March supplement of 2011 indicates that there are 11.64 million	11,640,000	12,000,000
Persons born in Mexico naturalized in the US	Data from CPS March supplement of 2011 indicates that there are 2.85 million The census bureau, using the 2010 census data, estimates that in that year naturalized voters amounted to 16.903 million, and taking into account that Mexicans represent 16.2% of all naturalizations between 1987-2012, and a population adjustment of 1.0124, it would mean that there were 2.77 million Mexicans residing in the US in 2011	2,850,000	2,770,000
Persons born in Mexico with father and/or mother who are US citizens, who are accounted as natives	Data from CPS March supplement of 2011 indicates that there are 290 thousand	290,000	290,000
Mexicans who are Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR) or holders of the Green Card residing in the US	Rytina (2012), calculates LPR based on the DHS administrative records, for January 2011. By law, a Green Card holder has to report his/her change of address in the US, and his/her exits/entries to the country, so this is a very reliable figure.	3,320,000	3,320,000
Non-immigrant Mexicans (Temporary workers, transfers between companies, students and teachers, diplomats, and others)	According to data of the USCIS for 2012, around 142,000 visas were issued for temporary workers (H-2A and H-2B), specialized workers, NAFTA professionals, inter-company transfers, students, teachers, au pairs, diplomats and victims. Considering a similar behavior in other years, and that on average they remain for 2 to 3 years which are not necessarily continuous in the US throughout their visa, there would be approximately 284 to 426 thousand non-immigrant Mexicans in the US	426,000	284,000
Remainder: Undocumented Mexican immigrants residing in the US	Will all these necessarily be unauthorized Mexican immigrants?	4,754,000	5,336,000


Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on different sources.

The question of whether or not the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US has been overestimated goes beyond the bounds of this article. Instead of concentrating on this figure, therefore, below we shall outline some of the main socio-demographic characteristics of unauthorized immigrants residing in the US; which are similar to the results reported by Hoefler et al. (2012).

In accordance with BBVA Research estimates using the CPS, the other immigrant groups, in addition to Mexicans, which would benefit most from having their undocumented status regularized, by volume, are as follows: India, El Salvador, China, Philippines and Guatemala. As we can see, the proportion of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico is over 10 times more than the country which is second in the ranking in 2012.


With regard to its geographical dispersion, California is at the top of the ranking as the state with the highest number of undocumented immigrants, with around 2.4 million, equivalent to almost 22% of the national total. In second place is Texas, with 1.63 million, and with lower participations: New York, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois, with figures of between 615 and 790 thousand undocumented immigrants in each one of these states. Almost 62% of all unauthorized immigrants in the US reside in these six states.

Graph 11
Undocumented immigrants in US, by country of birth, 2012 (thousands)



Note: The figures are rounded off
Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on the CPS.


Graph 12
Undocumented immigrants in the US, by state of residence, 2012 (thousands)



Note: The figures are rounded off
Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on the CPS.


By age groups, undocumented immigrants residing in the US are concentrated between 20 and 49 years, which are the most productive working ages, and represent almost three quarters of the total undocumented immigrants in the US. The distribution by sex indicates that 6.2 million of the almost 11.1 million of undocumented immigrants are men; in other words, 56%

Graph 13
Undocumented immigrants in the US, by age groups, 2012 (thousands)



Note: The figures are rounded off
Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on the CPS.

Graph 14
Undocumented immigrants in the US, by sex, 2012 (millions)



Note: The figures are rounded off
Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on the CPS.

Table 7

Estimate of number of Mexicans who would be able to obtain Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status

	Candidates for RPI status	Source and year of data
Unauthorized Mexican immigrants who entered the US on or before December 31, 2011	5,400,000	BBVA Bancomer, 2012
	6,500,000	PHC, 2011
	6,800,000	DHS, 2011

Note: Does not exclude immigrants who may have a serious criminal record
Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on CPS.

Dreamers

Established in the proposal of “Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2013” or “DREAM Act 2013” within the RPI section of the immigration reform, it is geared for unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States as children. The government of President Obama presents this as the opportunity which children who grew up as Americans - but who are unauthorized immigrants - should have of achieving the “dream” of having a university career and becoming US citizens.

Specifically, they should have entered the US at the age of 15 or less and on or before December 31, 2011, and they: a) have a university degree or an associate degree, or b) have earned a high-school diploma and have served for at least 4 years in the Uniformed Services. After being a Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) for at least 5 years, they will be able to apply to change to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status or the Green Card, and then carry out the procedure to acquire citizenship.

In the latest version of the bill, the age requirement when making the application is no longer mentioned, so that unauthorized immigrants who comply with the aforementioned requirements could apply, no matter what their age may be.

Based on Current Population Survey (CPS) supplement of 2012, unauthorized immigrants were estimated, and using the information on the current person’s age and the year they entered the US, their age when they entered the country can be deduced. Given that the survey was referred in March 2012, we can assume that all the immigrants included entered prior to December 31, 2011. It is important to note that the figure for undocumented immigrants with completed high-school education who have served in the Uniformed Services is very low. This could be because relatively young undocumented immigrants with completed high-school education do not necessarily enlist in the Uniformed Services. On the other hand, those who are older and who have served in the Uniformed Services, have very probably already been naturalized. Children younger than 12 years were classified as non-beneficiaries of the program, given that they still have on average at least 6 years to complete the high-school, and another 2 years of an associate degree qualification or 4 years in the Uniformed Services.

Table 8

Undocumented immigrants who may benefit from the “Dream Act”, 2012

Total unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States at 15 years old or younger	2,375,000 to 2,660,000
Possible beneficiaries of the “Dream Act”	1,435,000 to 1,580,000
Immediately comply with the requirements of the “Dream Act”	265,000 to 290,000
They have University level or above, or an associate degree	260,000 to 285,000
They have completed high school and have served in the Uniformed Services	< 5,000
Not immediately eligible, but very likely to be able to obtain the benefits of the “Dream Act”	1,170,000 to 1,290,000
They are currently studying (12 years or more) Earn a high school diploma and opt to: a) study at least an associate degree, or b) serve 4 years in the Uniformed Services	540,000 to 570,000
They do not currently study but have finished the high school They must a) study at least an associate degree, or b) serve 4 years in the Uniformed Services.	630,000 to 720,000
Not immediately eligible, but it is possible, though unlikely, that they may be able to benefit from the “Dream Act”	940,000 to 1,085,000
They do not currently study and do not have high school diploma (persons 12 years-old and over) They have to return to school and complete their studies to earn a high school diploma, and opt to: a) study at least an associate degree, or b) serve 4 years in the Uniformed Services	560,000 to 705,000
Under 12 years old Probably, when they eventually comply with the requirements, it is no longer an advantage for them to apply for the benefits of the Dream Act.	380,000

Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on CPS.

The estimates indicate that approximately 1.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the US may be able to obtain the benefits of the “Dream Act” and apply after a 5 year lapse with the RPI status for the Lawful Permanent Residency or Green Card. A little lower than 300,000 of this number already comply with the requirements and around 1.2 million can comply with them in coming years. Of the total aspirants to be “dreamers”, it is estimated that between 760 to 825 thousand were born in Mexico, in other words almost 52%.

Agricultural workers (Blue Card)

In the “Agricultural Worker Program Act of 2013” of the immigration reform bill, a special section is established for immigrants in agricultural tasks. The bill considers granting Blue Card status to agricultural workers who have entered US territory before or until December 31, 2012, and who have continuously worked in agriculture during the previous two years. It also considers granting the same status to the spouse and children of these workers who have entered the US before that same date. It grants similar benefits to RPI status, provided one works continuously in the agricultural sector. It has the advantage that the worker can start his application to change his status to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) or Green Card in 5 years, if he complies with the requirements, and subsequently apply for citizenship.

Table 9

Undocumented immigrants who can benefit from the Blue Card status, of the total unauthorized occupied immigrants, 2012

		Primary type of occupation	
		Non-agricultural	Agricultural
Sector of economic activity	Non-agricultural	7,530,000	40,000 (E.g. gardening)
	Agricultural	48,000 (Includes different technical and administrative activities connected to the agricultural sector, but not of the agricultural kind)	180,000 (Possible beneficiaries to obtain the Blue Card status. There is a possible significant underestimate of the unauthorized immigrants in rural areas)

Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on the CPS.

Our estimates from CPS indicate that in 2012 there were about 180 thousand undocumented agricultural workers who might be able to obtain the Blue Card status, of which 160,000, over 90%, are of Mexican origin. When the data from different years are analyzed, we see that between 2,500 and 5,000 undocumented immigrants of each country from Guatemala, El Salvador and the Philippines, may also obtain the Blue Card status. It is important to note that there is a significant underestimate of the number of unauthorized immigrants working in agricultural activities, so that this figure will have to be adjusted in accordance with the undercount.

Visas for temporary workers

In addition to the sections on reinforcing the border and the interior of the US, and on the regularization of unauthorized immigrants residing in the country, as outlined above, another pillar of this immigration reform bill includes an important component concerning about different visa programs for temporary workers. These include:

- **Extension of H-1B visas for highly skilled workers**, using an index which measures demand for highly skilled jobs in the US
- **Agricultural workers program**, when a labor shortage arises in the agricultural sector, the issue of non-immigrant visas for agricultural workers can be extended.
- **W Visas**, used for medium and low skilled workers, provided there are cases of labor shortage on the US job market. Construction workers are mentioned in this group.

About estimates of undocumented immigrants in the US through a labor market segmentation model

The two main sources of information which estimate the volume and characteristics of undocumented immigrants in the US are: 1) those published by the Pew Hispanic Center (PHC) calculated by Jeffery Passel and D'Vera Cohn (Passel, 2005; Passel and Cohn, 2011; Passel and Cohn, 2012; inter alia), and 2) those estimated by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (see Hoefler et al., 2011 and 2012).

The PHC estimates that approximately 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the United States in 2011, while the DHS data calculate that this figures is approximately 11.5 million, in both cases already considering the possible underestimate in the data. Both estimates arise from applying the residual method, whereby the population of undocumented immigrants is the figure that remains once the estimated population of immigrants authorized to reside in the US is subtracted from the immigrants born abroad (which does not include naturalized ones). The authorized immigrants group includes the Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) or holders of Green Cards, persons granted asylum, refugees, and non-immigrants such as temporary workers, diplomats, students, inter alia.

While Passel and Cohn use the data from the supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) as a base to estimate the population born abroad, Hoefler et al. make their calculations using the information of the American Community Survey (ACS). Both use the residual method, but the basic difference between the two estimates is the methodology used to calculate the immigrant population authorized in the US, which takes into account the following: the definition and characterization of who the authorized immigrants are, mortality and inter-state movement rates, return and circular movement rates, sample underestimate of source of information rates, pairing of databases with regard to the year of immigrants' declared entry to the US and by nationality, inter alia.

Handling of a large amount of data regarding immigrants by country of origin, year of entry, sex, state of residency, and other variables, can be a very complicated task, and assumptions in the variables for the migration dynamics of this group have to be presupposed and pre-established, in addition that best information to characterize them is not always available.

This article does not seek to replace previous calculations of unauthorized immigrants in the United States; in fact, it uses them as a base for the estimates. This study is intended to help provide a better understanding of the characteristics of undocumented immigrants in the United States through the use of an alternative methodology to the residual method, one which can complement results and the discoveries of these estimates.

One of the advantages of using estimates by labor market segmentation as against models by the residual method, is that it is not necessary to construct matrixes of the immigrant population, which generally imply carrying out calculations of the population over the years considering mortality rates, emigration rates and inter-state emigration estimates, inter alia; given that the data are taken from one single moment in time. Building an inter-temporal demographic model assumes handling many variables and predictive or estimated conducts over the course of time, for example, What impact does the variation in the return rate of Mexican immigrants from the US have on estimates? Is correct to assume that the return rates are similar amongst the different immigrant groups? Is it the same rate each year, or does it depend on temporary factors of the US or of the origin country? How do frequently circular Mexican immigrants affect the estimates?

The estimates which are obtained directly from data are more sensitive to structural and temporary changes of the socio-economic conditions which affect the population, and in particular, for immigrants in the United States, given that it does not depend on assuming any conduct of independent variables over the course of time, which tends to smooth out the point estimates in each year or to omit them.

Therefore, this article uses the basis of a the estimates of total volume of undocumented immigrants residing in the US carried out by the PHC and the DHS, to estimate a labor segmentation model which seeks to characterize the undocumented immigrant population, and, in particular, that of Mexican origin, enabling us to complement and compare with the estimates carried out using the residual method.

Labor market segmentation model

The labor market segmentation theory is based on a very simple idea, but one that could be very useful to identify certain population groups, particularly in this study: the undocumented immigrant population in the United States. Persons with very similar characteristics, for example: same sex and level of education, same state of residency and economic activity sector, should on average have a very similar level of wages. However, when there is labor segmentation² this cannot occur because some may have certain conditions which are external to their capacities and which prevent them from competing on an equal footing in the job market in comparison to another group. One of these conditions may be not having documents to be able to work in the United States.

² For further information on the implications of labor market segmentation see for example Harris and Todaro (1970), Dickens and Lang (1988), and Reich et al. (1973).

Undocumented immigrants are at a disadvantage in comparison with immigrants who do have authorization to work in the US, and thus have to rely on a smaller labor demand, meaning that they may obtain work of lower quality and pay, in spite of their labor capacities. The labor market is said to be segmented due to that there is a group of people –undocumented immigrants– who have similar characteristics and who would like to compete for the same jobs which are available to documented immigrants in the US, but who are unable to do so.

Thus, for a given function of income f^* which depends on a vector of the characteristics of person X , if X_1 and X_2 are very similar vectors, the labor market segmentation could mean that the income expectancy of person 1 with an external characteristic of $Y=1$, is on average below that of the person 2 with $Y=0$, in other words:

$$E(f(X_1|Y=1)) \leq E(f(X_2|Y=0)) \text{ with } X_1 \text{ and } X_2 \text{ similar}$$

In this study, therefore, a function of income is constructed which estimates what the labor income expectancy would be for a person with certain characteristics which allow them to be compared. The control variables which were used for the estimates were: a) sex (2 groups), b) age (7 groups), c) maximum level of studies (4 groups), d) main sector of economic activity (13 groups) and e) state of residency in the US (51 groups, 50 states and the capital).

It is then compared with the wages of the person and an index is calculated which can measure by what percentage it is above or below the expected income in light of his or her characteristics, economic activity and residency status. Persons standing at lower levels in comparison with their expected income are considered to be more likely on average to suffer labor market segmentation, particularly that relating to not having authorization to work in the US. Given that the model only estimates labor segmentation for the occupied population, this same value is assigned to the rest of the members of the household who do not work; it is assumed that it is more likely that an undocumented person lives in a household with another undocumented person. For households lacking labor data, a neutral value is left in the index (zero).

Methodology and data treatment

Throughout the methodology, some of the best practices proposed by Passel and Cohn (2010), and by Hoefler et al. (2012) for estimating undocumented immigrants resident in the United States, were included. The source of information for the immigrant population born outside the US was calculated based on the supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Adjustments are subsequently made in the calculations due to possible sample undercounting of authorized and unauthorized immigrants, which might not have been captured by the survey, and in relation to temporary workers.

According to the methodology used by Passel and Cohn (2008 and 2010), certain modifications were made in the information of the country of birth of the records where this data is not expressly indicated, such as the data indicated as follows:

- West Indies, not specified
- South America, not specified
- Americas, not specified
- Asia, not specified
- Africa, not specified
- Europe, not specified
- Oceania, not specified
- Elsewhere

These already weighted records represent on average 800,000 born outside the United States for each year between 2009 and 2012, persons whose country of origin it is essential to be able to identify as possible. Therefore, an attempt was made to assign them a possible country of birth using other columns of the database, with variables such as: Is he/she Hispanic?, Type of Hispanic, Mother's country of birth and Father's country of birth. Although it was not wholly possible to identify the country of birth, aggregate estimates do include those persons who do not have a country, but a region; thus, for example, the group of Latin Americans also includes "West Indies, not specified", "South America, not specified", "Americas, not specified" and those persons who said they were Hispanic. Similarly, Hispanic immigrants who said they were of Mexican origin were presumed to have been born in Mexico. In the identification process, the races variable was only assigned to generic regions when the region of origin was "Elsewhere".

Unlike the works by Passel and Cohn, the assigning of countries does correspond to its geographically defined regions, as it was not necessary to simplify in any way in this regard. As stated by other authors, the country of birth allows us to have better estimates by country and region of origin, hardly affecting the data which are presented in aggregate form on the immigrants, whether these immigrants are documented or not.

In a similar way to the methodology of Passel and Cohn, and Hoefler et al., in order to simplify it is assumed that immigrants who entered the United States before 1980, who have now resided in the US for over 32 years, have already obtained lawful residency. Persons born in Cuba are not included in the group of undocumented people, because in accordance with United States laws, they are treated into the refugee category.

The expected income function, which depends on the variables earlier indicated, is estimated for each year under study, so that it allows for variations in the labor structure and in the remuneration in accordance with the own particular conditions of the economic cycle of each year; and, subsequently, the difference against declared wages is calculated. For the 2012 figure - the only year reported in the study, given that the model does not estimate the volume of undocumented immigrants - the 2011 data proposed in Passel and Cohn (2012) was taken as the preliminary figure.

Before the final identification of undocumented immigrants via the threshold of the total volume of this population, a filter of variables is applied in which it is considered very unlikely that an unauthorized immigrant can access them. Therefore, a filter was applied taking into account the following variables: a) being employed in the local, state or federal government, b) receiving unemployment insurance, c) receiving social security, d) receiving public assistance due to poverty, e) having a public pension, f) receiving support as a veteran, g) receiving public educational assistance, h) having a public medical insurance such as Medicare, Medicaid or Civilian Health and Medical Program (e.g. CHAMPVA, TRICARE), and i) for legal minors, being registered in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP).

Limitations

The current estimates from the labor market segmentation model indicate in what proportion each person should receive in labor income due to their characteristics in comparison to their reported income. However, it requires the cut-off point to be established to indicate the threshold for separating undocumented immigrants from those who are authorized to work. Therefore, the estimates carried out by the Pew Hispanic Center (Passel y Cohn, 2011 and 2012) were taken as the estimate of total undocumented immigrants.

It is important to note that the model is based on the fact that there is labor market segmentation between documented and undocumented migrants, leading persons from the latter group to have lower income despite having similar characteristics to persons of the former group, a fact which is generally accepted (see Borjas, 1994, and Borjas, 1988).

Furthermore, in a similar way to the estimates of Passel and Cohn, and of Hoefer et al, the calculations of this article may have limitations on precision arising from the source of information. These include: a) Precision regarding the undercounting of the immigrant population born abroad (which we assume are similar to those of PHC and DHS), b) Precision in the wages reported, and c) Precision regarding certain characteristics and accesses to public assistance which it is difficult for an undocumented immigrant to have.³

Conclusions

Between 11.1 and 11.5 million undocumented immigrants reside in the US, of whom 5.4 to 6.8 million were born in Mexico; in other words, between 47% and 59% of all unauthorized immigrants in the US are Mexicans. This is why the controversial immigration reform taking place in the US is so important for Mexico, a reform which at the time this article went to press had been approved by the Senate and would begin to be debated in the House of Representatives.

According to BBVA Research estimates, over 62% of unauthorized immigrants in the US reside in only six states: California, Texas, New York, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois. Almost three quarters of these immigrants are aged between 20 and 49, which are the most productive working ages; and approximately 56% of them are men and 44% are women.

If this immigration reform bill is passed in the way it was approved by the Senate, the immigration status of over 11 million undocumented immigrants residing in US territory, many of whom are Mexican, would be regularized. Furthermore, the visa issuance procedure would be extended and facilitated for non-immigrants, who would depend on the labor shortage in the US for both highly skilled jobs (H-1B visas), and for medium and low skill jobs (W visas) and agricultural labor. The other side of the immigration reform is the heavy border reinforcement in infrastructure, technological equipment, and more security personnel, as well as better interior enforcement of immigrants with better verification systems.

These more than 11 million immigrants who would regularize their immigration status would obtain what is called Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status, meaning they would have no restrictions to work in any job and to travel outside the USA and then return, not being able to be apprehended or deported by migration authorities unless they commit a serious breach of the law.

What is more, once they comply with the established requirements, they would then be able to apply for Lawful Permanent Residence (LPR) or the Green Card, through a Merit Based System, and subsequently follow the procedure to obtain US citizenship.

Within the current migration reform bill, two groups are set to enjoy more favorable conditions. One of them is the "dreamers" group, which refers to undocumented immigrants who entered the US at the age of 15 or less, and on or before December 31, 2011, and who: a) have at least a university or associate degree, or b) who have earned a high-school diploma and have served in Uniformed Services for at least four years. This group would have the benefit of being able to apply in only five years for Lawful Permanent Residence (LPR) status, or Green Card, and then apply to obtain citizenship.

It is estimated that 1.5 million unauthorized immigrants could aspire to be "dreamers", a little fewer than 300 thousand of whom already comply with the requirements, and 1.2 million of which would be able to comply with them in the coming years. Of the total aspirants to be "dreamers", it is estimated that from 760 to 825 thousand were born in Mexico (about 52%).

The second group, which can aspire to special conditions, is the undocumented agricultural workers. The bill considers granting Blue Card status to these workers who have entered US territory before or until December 31, 2011, and who have continuously worked in agriculture during the previous two years. It grants the same benefits as RPI status, providing the work is continuously in the agricultural

³ Data concerning public assistance - which it is very difficult for undocumented immigrants to access - allow us better precision in identifying documented immigrants and undocumented ones. From the estimates made without using this control criterion, the results presented do not appear to change significantly and no trend whatsoever is observed.

sector, and has the advantage that workers can apply for Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) or Green Card in 5 years, and subsequently apply for citizenship.

It is estimated that about 180,000 undocumented agricultural workers in the US would stand to benefit from the Blue Card status, with 90% of these workers born in Mexico. It is important to note that there is a significant undercounting of the unauthorized immigrants working in agricultural activities, so that this figure will have to be adjusted in accordance with the underestimate.

Therefore, the immigration reform would open a long procedure whereby an unauthorized immigrant who may have entered the US on or before December 31, 2011, begins by almost immediately regularizing his immigration status and can subsequently obtain US citizenship.

Summary table

The table below shows a summary of the regions of origin of undocumented immigrants who might be able to benefit from the immigration reform.

Table 10

Immigration reform in the US, how many people, and who, would benefit by region of origin?

Country/region of origin	Undocumented immigrants who would be able to obtain Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status*	Dreamers	Agricultural workers (Blue Card)**
Mexico	5,400,000 to 6,800,000	760,000 to 825,000	160,000
Asia	2,255,000	245,000	< 5,000
Central America	955,000	105,000	< 10,000
Europe	655,000	90,000	n.a.
South America	695,000	90,000	n.a.
The Caribbean	525,000	90,000	< 10,000
Africa	410,000	35,000	n.a.
Oceania	50,000	10,000	n.a.
Canada	140,000	30,000	n.a.
TOTAL	11,100,000 to 11,500,000	1,435,000 to 1,580,000	180,000

* * Any undocumented immigrant who does not have a serious criminal record and who entered the US on or before December 31, 2011, can aspire to obtain RPI status, if he complies with requirements. The Dreamers and Blue Cards account for part of this total, but can obtain more favorable immigration conditions.

** There may be an important underestimate of the number of unauthorized immigrants working in agricultural activities.

Note: These calculations do not include the possibility of serious criminal records, and indirect beneficiaries such as the spouse and children of the holder of the RPI, who may also obtain this status. The amounts may not match due to rounding off.

Source: BBVA Research, estimates based on the CPS, except for estimates of total undocumented immigrants, and of undocumented Mexican immigrants, which derive from calculations by BBVA Research based on Passel y Cohn (2012) and Hoefer et al. (2012).

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Box 1: Advantages of US Citizenship vs. US Permanent Residence

US Citizen	US Lawful Permanent Residence (Green Card)
<p>Holders of the Green Card have many rights and obligations held by a citizen:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They are protected by federal, state and local laws. • They have the same fiscal obligations, and must pay taxes on all their income obtained in the US and worldwide. • They have the right to obtain Social Security Retirement Benefits, if they work for at least 10 years and comply with the number of work credits stated by the Social Security Administration (just like any other citizen). • Males between the ages of 18 and 26 have to register with the Selective Service. • They can apply for public grants for education. • They can own property, have their own business or create their corporation. 	
Main advantages of US Citizenship vs. Green Card	
It is the highest level which an immigrant can achieve.	He/she can reside and work in the US and have many of the rights and obligations of an American citizen.
<p>He/she can bring to the US his/her spouse, unmarried children, and sons and daughters under 21, sons and daughters married 21 years old or over and their spouse and children.</p> <p>He/she may also bring his/her parents and siblings to the US, if the applicant is 21 or over.</p> <p>He/she may also apply to bring a foreign national fiancé (e) to marry.</p>	He/she can bring to the US only his/her spouse, unmarried children under 21, and unmarried sons or daughters of any age.
He/she cannot be stripped of his/her citizenship or be deported, unless fraud was committed in the naturalization process.	<p>A permanent resident can be deported, however.</p> <p>He/she can lose his/her residency status if: a) He/she does not notify to US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of his/her change of residency, b) He/she commits a serious crime, or c) He/she takes part in terrorist or espionage activities.</p> <p>He/she will also have to renew his lawful residency when it expires, which could be rejected.</p>
Once he/she has obtained citizenship, he/she can reside and stay outside the US, just like any US-born citizen and return to the country without impediment.	He/she can lose residency status if he/she remains outside the country for a long period of time, and every time he/she enters the US he/she will have to show he/she is "admissible".
Generally, a citizen is not obliged by law to carry his/her ID	The laws of the United States require the Green Card to be carried at all times, and it will have to be shown if so required
They can access all the social benefits programs at different government levels	Generally, they can only obtain benefits from public programs which do not imply a direct transfer of cash. It is not always clearly established whether a permanent resident may or may not be entitled to a social assistance program.
He/she can vote and be voted for*.	He/she cannot vote in federal, state or local elections (except for a few cases).
Some federal jobs and from state and local governments, require persons to be citizens*.	
Certain private and state grants are restricted to US citizens.	

Note: * There are certain public government positions and jobs that require US born citizenship.

Source: Self-elaboration with data from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and <http://www.uscitizenship.info/>

4. Labor incompatibility: the new phase of Mexican migration to the US

Since 2008, there has been virtually no growth in the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States. Some believe that this situation is due to contraction in the US labor markets, so that once the US economy's recovery is consolidated, growth in immigration will be resumed. Others believe that what we are seeing is a turning point in immigration due largely to demographic changes and economic improvements in Mexico. This article seeks to focus on this debate. It begins by reviewing phases of Mexican migration to the United States, and then turns to analyze factors encouraging emigration in Mexico and the factors which do so in the United States. We analyze if there are elements which might indicate a new phase in Mexican migration.

Phases in Mexican emigration to the United States

Massey *et al.* (2002) state that the first phase of Mexican migration to the United States was from 1900 to 1929, a period during which groups of workers were established on the basis of family ties, workers who went to work in agriculture and on the railroads. During this period, it is estimated that about 730,000 Mexicans emigrated to the US, with Texas as the main destination. The second phase took place between 1930 and 1941, marked by a mass deportation and limited movement of people; more than half a million Mexicans were repatriated during this period (Durand, 2000).

Prompted by the demand for workers in the United States during the Second World War, the third phase took place between 1942 and 1964. During this period the "Bracero" program was established: a bilateral agreement in which Mexican workers were hired on a temporary basis to carry out agricultural work. It is estimated that around 5 million Mexican workers emigrated with papers to the United States. This became one of the most important historical waves of emigration experienced until that date. Mexican immigrants began to settle in California, and to build social networks which would help them to move and to expand to other states.

The fourth phase is referred as the undocumented migration, and takes place from 1965 to 1986. It began when the US government suspended the "Bracero" program, which brought on the proliferation of smuggling and traffic of undocumented immigrants. The number of Mexicans apprehended increased from slightly over 1 per 1,000 in 1965, to 21 per 1,000 in 1986. However, despite immigration control, there was a net increase of Mexican immigrants in the US similar to that observed in the preceding period: approximately 5.7 million entered the US, 81% undocumented (Massey, et. al., 2002).

Lastly, the fifth phase began in 1986. That year, Mexico joined the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)* and the *Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)* was passed in the US. From then on, the two economies have tended towards strengthening their commercial and financial integration, and this has heightened the migration flows. The characteristics of this period are: the consolidation of immigrants social networks, the increase in female immigration, the fact that immigrants have moved all over the different parts of the US, generally to productive sectors different from the traditional ones; they appear in construction, in manufacturing and in services; a high proportion of immigrants has extended their stay in the US and no longer considers their potential return, becoming integrated within United States society and forming part of their second or later generation immigrant families. Until 2007, Mexican emigration exhibited a trend of growth; data for 2007 from the *Yearbook of Migration and Remittances, Mexico 2013* show that the number of people of Mexican origin residing in the US was 30.3 million, 11.8 of which were born in Mexico and the remainder in the US. However, after the beginning of the global economic crisis - which officially started in December 2007 - Mexican emigration was halted, and now, 4 years after the crisis official ended, it has yet to recover.¹ What factors are behind this situation? Is it only a temporary situation? Can it be said that a new stage has begun in Mexico-United States emigration? In the following sections, we shall seek answers to these questions, and to do so we shall analyze the main elements which expel and attract Mexican immigration to the United States.

¹ The institution which officially declares economic cycles in the United States is The National Bureau of Economic Research. See <http://www.nber.org/cycles.html>.

Push factors in Mexico


a) Demographic factors

The Nobel Prize in Economics winner Gary Becker² recently said that an important cause for the fall in undocumented emigration from Mexico to the United States is the heavy reduction in the Mexican birth rate, which means that there is no longer strong growth in young people in Mexico - as there has been in the past - leading to a gradual reduction in the number of people seeking work in the US labor market. In this section, we shall analyze whether the demographic factors have played a relevant role in reducing Mexican emigration to the United States.

The Current Population Survey (CPS) data show that the number of Mexican immigrants has barely grown since 2008, unlike other major immigrant groups with a heavy presence in the United States. If the birth rate as a factor were having an important impact in this situation, then the birth rate would have to be falling to a greater degree in Mexico than in other regions, and be lower than that of regions which are reporting the greatest increases in migratory flows.

Graph 15

Immigrants in the United States (million)



Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

World Bank data show that birth rates in Mexico have indeed fallen considerably, but that this trend is not exclusive to Mexico, but is in fact a situation which is happening at a global level, but this has not stopped immigrants from certain countries reaching the United States. What is more, the Mexican birth rate is actually above that of European and Asian countries, which show a more positive trend in migration flows to US than Mexico. Therefore, the birth rate cannot be the reason for the recent fall in migration flows from Mexico to the United States, and while it may have some impact, it does so in the long term and in a gradual way, so that it cannot appear suddenly.


According to projections by the National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población), the number of people in Mexico between the ages of 15 and 29 will continue to grow until 2022; however, it is expected that by 2050 this group will have a significant size of 30.5 million people, very similar to its current size. At this point it is important to consider that the Mexican immigrant population has tended to increase in recent years and that currently 65% of Mexican immigrants in the United States are between 15 and 49 years old. According to CONAPO projections, the population within this age bracket in Mexico will continue to increase until 2042, and by 2050 there would be almost 69 million Mexicans between these ages.

These figures suggest that the fall in Mexican emigration to the United States cannot be attributed to demographic factors, given that its main effects will be felt within 15 or 20 years.

² See <http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/03/the-decline-in-illegal-immigration-from-mexico-becker.html>

Graph 16


Birth rates (for every 1000 inhabitants)



Source: BBVA Research with World Bank data

Graph 17


Forecasts for young Mexican population (15 to 29 years) 1930-2050



Note: From 2020 on, CONAPO projections
Source: BBVA Research with INEGI and CONAPO data

Graph 18

Forecast for Mexican population of 15 to 44 years, 1930-2050



Note: From 2020 on, CONAPO projections
Source: BBVA Research with INEGI and CONAPO data


b) Economic factors in Mexico

Some analysts and authorities have stated that the economic improvements in Mexico are the main reason behind the reduction of Mexican emigration to the United States. It has been argued that the average years of educational attainment of Mexican population has increased in recent years (from 7.5 in 2000 to 8.6 in 2010), that Mexico's GDP has grown on average 4% every year for the last 9 years (not including the fall in 2009), and that the Mexican population's ownership of durable goods has increased.

While there is no doubt that many Mexicans benefitted from these improvements, and thus some potential emigrants would think twice leaving Mexico, it is important to verify if this situation was widespread throughout Mexican society. An important element is the gap between earnings in Mexico and the United States. Figures from the OECD show that the difference in labor compensation per employee between the U.S. and Mexico has increased in recent years, so that the economic improvements which have occurred in Mexico have not allowed Mexicans to close the wages gap compared to the United States. Given that Mexican emigration is largely for economic reasons, and that the labor compensation difference between the United States and Mexico is a relevant variable which has an impact on the decision to emigrate, and that the gap has increased, it is unlikely that the economic improvements in Mexico have had much to do with the reduction in Mexican emigration.

Graph 19

**Labor compensation per employee in United States and Mexico
(Dollars adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity)**



Source: BBVA Research with OECD figures

Therefore, the main drivers in Mexico which encourage Mexican emigration are still running. In other words, there is a supply of labor from Mexico. What happens in terms of the labor demand in the United States? This question is analyzed in the following sections.

Pull factors in the United States


In previous articles of *Mexico Migration Outlook*³ it has been shown that the primary driver of Mexican emigration to the United States is the economic cycle in that country; when the US economy grows and employment increases, more Mexicans tend to emigrate, and on the other hand when the US economy stagnates and there is less employment, Mexican emigration falls.

Before the economic crisis there was a clearer relationship between Mexican emigration and the US economic cycle; the emigration trend was observed to be very similar to that of the employment rate and of growth in Gross Domestic Product (see charts). Undocumented migration also had a very clear relationship with the US economic cycle, and this was shown by the fact that the number of Mexicans apprehended (variable which indicates undocumented immigration) was strongly correlated with the growth in the US economy. Recently, however, the relationship between migration and the economic cycle has not been as clear as before. Although there has been some degree of recovery in the US economy and in its employment, there has not been an accompanying clear trend towards recovery in migratory flows from Mexico.

³ See issue of November 2010

Graph 20


Annual flow of Mexican immigrants to the US and employment rate in the US, 1991-2012



Note: Migratory flow estimates by BBVA Research from 2011 on
Source: BBVA Research with data of Passel, et. al (2012) and Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Graph 21

Annual flow of Mexican immigrants to the US and GDP growth rate in the US, 1991-2012



Note: Migratory flow estimates by BBVA Research from 2011 on
Source: BBVA Research with data of Passel, et. al (2012) and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).

Graph 22

US: Mexicans apprehended by Border Patrol and GDP growth rate, 1995 - 2011



Source: BBVA Research based on Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data

What happened? Why does the relationship between the US economic cycle and Mexican migration seem to have been broken? If, as we have shown, the push factors encouraging Mexican emigration (largely focused on labor), in general, are still valid, then the explanation must be found in pull factors.

Employment in the United States is the primary factor which attracts Mexican migration, but while the first one has begun to grow, US Mexican immigrants have not done so. It would appear that there are factors which have a particular impact on the demand for employment of Mexican immigrants.


What factors affect the demand for employment of Mexican immigrants?

a) Demand for employment by sectors

Mexican immigrants in the United States tend to concentrate in labor-intensive sectors such as construction, manufacturing, food and accommodation services, and trade. By and large, these sectors reported strong economic growth in the 1990s and up until the economic crisis, enabling there to be a great demand for Mexican immigrant labor. However, these were some of the industries which lost the most employment in the wake of the economic crisis (75% of jobs lost in the United States were in construction, manufacturing and trade) and in general they have reported sluggish economic growth in recent years, and have not managed to recover the jobs lost. In sectors such as mining and oil, professional and business services, educational and health services and social assistance, however, there has been the highest growth in employment, and in most of these sectors there are low levels of Mexican immigrant labor.


The economic crisis thus brought about a reshaping of economic growth by sectors and therefore on labor demand, with the result of there being less demand for Mexican immigrant labor. There is currently an inverse relationship between the average economic growth by sectors and the concentration of Mexican immigrants in each sector, when the relationship used to be positive prior to the crisis. In other words, Mexican immigrants used to be in the sectors which reported higher growth, but now in general, they are in the industries of least growth (see graphs).

Graph 23
US: Proportion of Mexican immigrants by industry in 2007 vs. average annual growth by industry between 2003 and 2007



Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

Graph 24
US: Proportion of Mexican immigrants by industry in 2012 vs. average annual growth by industry between 2008 and 2012



Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data


b) Demand for employment by education level

Over the last two decades, and in a more pronounced way since 2007, there has been a trend of greater demand in the US for highly skilled workers. The percentage of employees with undergraduate, postgraduate and professional degree went from 26% in 1995 to 30% in 2006 and to 34% in 2012; so that 63% of employees in the United States in 2012 have over 12 years of education. However, the supply of labor by Mexican immigrants has not been able to adapt to the speed at which these changes have occurred in demand. In 1995, 84% of Mexican immigrants employed had received no more than 12 years of schooling; while by 2012, this proportion had only fallen to 82%. Although the proportion of Mexican immigrants with undergraduate, postgraduate and professional degree has increased between 1995 and 2012, it was lagged behind national growth (6 percentage points lower).

The data show that from 2008 on, there was a fall in the proportion of Mexican immigrants who had recently entered⁴ the United States with 12 years of education or less, while the number of immigrants with an associate degree or above rose from 9% to almost 30% in 2012. This situation of demand towards higher educational levels appears to be more structural and this trend will probably continue, so that if the level and quality of education in Mexico does not increase there will likely be less demand for Mexican labor by the US economy.

Graph 25


United States: percentage of employees at national level and percentage of Mexican immigrants employed, by educational attainment



Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

Graph 26

Mexican Immigrants recently arrived in the United States, by educational attainment



Source: BBVA Research with Current Population Survey data

c) Arizona effect

In other editions of *Mexico Migration Outlook*⁵ we showed how actions against undocumented immigrants - which became more noticeable in early 2010 through what is known as the "SB 1070" law in Arizona - had a particular impact on the employment of Mexican immigrants as they were the group with the largest number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, and because a high proportion of Mexican immigrants are undocumented, as shown in the previous article. This has also affected the labor demand for Mexican immigrant workers.

d) Forward-looking factors

Looking into the future, the trend of demand for highly skilled workers is likely to continue, and perhaps in the short and mid terms, growth will continue in sectors which require workers with a higher educational level. This means that the demand for Mexican immigrants will remain sluggish. It would be important to consider that a migration reform bill is being debated in the United States, a bill which proposes, inter alia, greater border control with Mexico, greater regulation of migration flows, and the granting of visas

⁴ Considering immigrants who said they had entered the US over the last three years in each one of the Current Population Surveys

⁵ See July 2012 edition

towards more highly skilled immigrants. These factors might discourage the demand for undocumented labor and would not necessarily be favorable for the supply of Mexican immigrant labor as a whole, and, consequently, we might be led to assume that migration flows over the next 3 to 5 years will be relatively low.

Conclusions: Labor incompatibility of Mexican migration. The new phase of emigration from Mexico to United States

Push and pull factors exert an influence on Mexican emigration to the United States. The former are to be found in Mexico and the latter in the United States. Up until the onset of the recent economic crisis, which began in December 2007, the two forces were aligned and there was a high degree of compatibility between the workforce needed by the United States and that supplied by Mexico. This allowed migratory flows to increase significantly and for the number of Mexican immigrants to increase year after year over the last two decades until 2007. In recent years, however, although there do not seem to be many great changes in the push factors, so that while the supply of Mexican labor towards the United States on the whole appears to continue, the demand for Mexican immigrants appears to have changed.

Demand for Mexican immigrant workers was largely affected by the reshaping in the economic growth by industries in the United States, where less skilled labor-intensive sectors have failed to maintain the rates of growth seen in previous decades, and where the industries with the strongest growth usually demand high-skilled workers. We also have to consider other factors which restrict the demand for Mexican immigrant labor, such as actions taken against undocumented immigrants (most of whom are Mexicans) carried out in certain states. Structural factors such as the higher concentration of demand for more skilled jobs also have an important role to play. Certain aspects of the immigration reform in the United States point towards maintaining this factor and to give facilities for hiring more highly skilled documented workers.

Thus, the situation described indicates that there has been a new phase of Mexican immigration since 2007, shaped by a certain degree of incompatibility between the labor demand of the United States and the supply of Mexican immigrants; a situation which had never come about in the history of Mexican immigration, or at least one which had never occurred in a significant form. The factors defining this new phase of Mexican migration to the US are: lower migratory flows, lower entry of undocumented immigrants, and an increase in the proportion of new documented and more highly skilled Mexican immigrants.

When will this phase end? For this to happen, economic growth in the United States will once again have to be concentrated in labor-intensive sectors, or the supply of Mexican immigrant labor will have to quickly adapt to the new characteristics of the demand and bring about an increase in its labor skills.

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5. Statistical Appendix

Table 11

International immigrants (Millions)

	Total					Women					Men				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
World	155.5	166.0	178.5	195.2	213.9	76.4	81.8	88.3	96.1	104.8	79.1	84.2	90.2	99.2	109.1
By type of country of destiny															
Developed countries	82.4	94.1	104.4	117.2	127.7	42.8	48.7	54.1	60.5	65.7	39.6	45.5	50.3	56.7	62.0
Developing countries	73.2	71.8	74.1	78.1	86.2	33.6	33.1	34.2	35.6	39.1	39.6	38.7	39.9	42.5	47.2
By region of destiny															
North America	27.8	33.6	40.4	45.6	50.0	14.2	17.1	20.4	23.0	25.1	13.6	16.5	20.0	22.6	25.0
Lat. Am & the Caribbean	7.1	6.2	6.5	6.9	7.5	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.7	3.6	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.7
Europe	49.4	54.7	57.6	64.4	69.8	26.0	28.7	30.4	33.8	36.5	23.4	26.0	27.2	30.6	33.3
Africa	16.0	17.9	17.1	17.7	19.3	7.4	8.4	8.0	8.3	9.0	8.6	9.5	9.1	9.4	10.3
Asia	50.9	48.8	51.9	55.1	61.3	23.1	22.1	23.7	24.8	27.3	27.8	26.7	28.2	30.3	34.0
Oceania	4.4	4.7	5.0	5.5	6.0	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.8	3.1	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.9

Source: BBVA Research with figures from United Nations Population Division

Annual inflow of remittances (Billions of dollars)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010e	2011p	2012p	2013p	2014p
World	276.9	320.9	393.9	457.2	428.5	453.1	500.6	533.0	571.0	615.0
Developed countries	90.0	99.5	115.8	133.2	120.2	120.9	128.4	134.0	141.0	148.0
Developing countries	186.9	221.4	278.1	324.0	308.3	332.1	372.2	399.0	430.0	467.0
East Asia and Pacific	48.7	55.8	71.4	84.8	86.3	95.4	107.5	115.0	125.0	135.0
South Asia	33.9	42.5	54.0	71.6	75.1	82.2	97.2	104.0	113.0	122.0
Lat. America and the Caribbean	49.8	58.9	63.0	64.4	56.8	57.2	61.7	66.0	72.0	77.0
Europe and Central Asia	19.7	24.9	38.7	45.3	36.4	36.6	41.2	45.0	49.0	55.0
Middle East and North Africa	25.1	26.5	32.1	36.0	33.6	40.2	42.4	45.0	47.0	50.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.7	12.8	18.8	21.7	20.1	20.5	22.2	24.0	25.0	27.0

e: WorldBank estimates

p: WorldBank forecast

Source: BBVA Research with figures from WorldBank.

Immigration to the United States (Millions)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total population	274.1	276.5	282.1	285.9	288.3	291.2	293.8	296.8	299.1	301.5	304.3	306.1	308.8
Immigrants	30.3	31.8	34.4	35.7	36.7	37.4	37.9	39.5	39.6	38.9	39.9	40.5	42.2
By sex													
Men	15.1	15.9	17.3	17.9	18.4	18.9	19.1	19.9	19.9	19.4	20.0	20.1	20.7
Women	15.2	15.9	17.1	17.8	18.3	18.5	18.8	19.6	19.7	19.5	19.9	20.4	21.5
By age group													
Under 15	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.0
Between 15 and 64	24.7	26.0	28.5	29.5	30.4	30.9	31.4	32.8	32.7	32.2	32.9	33.4	35.0
Over 64	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.2
By region of origin													
Latin America & the Caribbean	14.9	15.5	17.5	18.4	18.9	19.4	19.7	20.7	20.5	20.3	20.9	21.0	21.5
Asia and Oceania	7.8	8.1	8.8	9.2	9.5	9.8	10.1	10.6	10.9	10.9	11.0	11.4	12.5
Europe	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.4	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.5	5.6	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.5
África	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.8
Canada	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
Not specified	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0

Source: BBVA Research estimates from Current Population Survey (CPS).

Table 12

Labor situation of Hispanics and Mexicans in the U.S. (Figures in thousands)

	2010				2011				2012				2013
	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	
Total population*													
Pop. 16 years old & over	237,506	238,104	238,712	238,852	239,316	239,871	240,431	242,436	242,968	243,564	244,169	244,828	
Civilian labor force	154,103	153,917	153,823	153,291	153,466	153,702	154,017	154,629	154,866	154,899	155,469	155,402	
Employed	139,233	139,320	139,146	139,456	139,564	139,848	140,660	141,883	142,228	142,463	143,303	143,367	
Unemployed	14,871	14,598	14,677	13,835	13,902	13,854	13,356	12,747	12,638	12,437	12,166	12,035	
Labor force participation rate	64.9	64.6	64.4	64.2	64.1	64.1	64.1	63.8	63.7	63.6	63.7	63.5	
Unemployment rate	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.0	9.1	9.0	8.7	8.2	8.2	8.0	7.8	7.7	
Hispanics*													
Pop. 16 years old & over	33,580	33,837	34,101	34,078	34,311	34,555	34,806	36,383	36,627	36,881	37,145	37,168	
Civilian labor force	22,662	22,823	22,907	22,591	22,746	22,944	23,319	24,122	24,467	24,428	24,551	24,496	
Employed	19,855	20,033	19,984	19,952	20,073	20,353	20,707	21,594	21,828	21,955	22,139	22,179	
Unemployed	2,807	2,789	2,923	2,639	2,673	2,590	2,612	2,528	2,640	2,472	2,413	2,318	
Labor force participation rate	67.5	67.4	67.2	66.3	66.3	66.4	67.0	66.3	66.8	66.2	66.1	65.9	
Unemployment rate	12.4	12.2	12.8	11.7	11.8	11.3	11.2	10.5	10.8	10.1	9.8	9.5	
Hispanics													
Pop. 16 years old & over	33,580	33,837	34,101	34,078	34,311	34,555	34,806	36,383	36,627	36,881	37,145	37,168	
Civilian labor force	22,637	22,886	22,890	22,557	22,733	23,008	23,292	24,075	24,472	24,496	24,523	24,418	
Employed	19,942	20,139	20,016	19,729	20,163	20,459	20,724	21,368	21,928	22,066	22,148	21,954	
Unemployed	2,695	2,747	2,874	2,829	2,570	2,549	2,568	2,707	2,543	2,430	2,375	2,464	
Labor force participation rate	67.4	67.6	67.1	66.2	66.3	66.6	66.9	66.2	66.8	66.4	66.0	65.7	
Unemployment rate	11.9	12.0	12.6	12.5	11.3	11.1	11.0	11.2	10.4	9.9	9.7	10.1	
Mexicans													
Pop. 16 years old & over	21,182	21,170	21,433	21,249	21,315	21,731	21,780	22,585	22,667	22,622	22,992	23,121	
Civilian labor force	14,322	14,361	14,462	14,117	14,149	14,524	14,651	15,026	15,178	15,107	15,204	15,190	
Employed	12,642	12,745	12,632	12,285	12,558	12,935	13,011	13,258	13,576	13,626	13,746	13,633	
Unemployed	1,680	1,616	1,831	1,832	1,591	1,589	1,639	1,768	1,602	1,481	1,457	1,557	
Labor force participation rate	67.6	67.8	67.5	66.4	66.4	66.8	67.3	66.5	67.0	66.8	66.1	65.7	
Unemployment rate	11.7	11.3	12.7	13.0	11.2	10.9	11.2	11.8	10.6	9.8	9.6	10.3	
U.S.-born Mexicans													
Pop. 16 years old & over	10,260	10,248	10,511	10,327	10,393	10,809	10,858	11,663	11,745	11,700	12,070	12,199	
Civilian labor force	6,781	6,820	6,921	6,576	6,608	6,983	7,110	7,485	7,637	7,566	7,663	7,649	
Employed	5,795	5,898	5,785	5,438	5,711	6,088	6,164	6,411	6,729	6,779	6,899	6,786	
Unemployed	986	922	1,136	1,138	897	895	946	1,074	908	787	764	863	
Labor force participation rate	66.1	66.5	65.8	63.7	63.6	64.6	65.5	64.2	65.0	64.7	63.5	62.7	
Unemployment rate	14.5	13.5	16.4	17.3	13.6	12.8	13.3	14.3	11.9	10.4	10.0	11.3	
Mexican immigrants													
Pop. 16 years old & over	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	10,922	
Civilian labor force	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	7,541	
Employed	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	6,847	
Unemployed	694	694	694	694	694	694	694	694	694	694	694	694	
Labor force participation rate	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	69.0	
Unemployment rate	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	

* Seasonally Adjusted.

Source: BBVA Research with figures from Bureau of Labor Statistics and estimations from Current Population Survey (CPS), 2006-2012

Table 13

Mexican Immigrants in the United States

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total Mexicans in the U.S. (Millions)	23.2	24.0	25.5	26.7	26.9	28.1	29.3	30.3	30.7	31.7	32.3	32.5	33.7
Mexican immigrants	8.1	8.5	9.9	10.2	10.7	11.0	11.1	11.8	11.8	11.9	11.9	11.6	11.9
2nd & 3rd generation	14.4	14.9	16.0	16.8	16.6	17.5	18.2	18.5	18.9	19.8	20.4	20.9	21.8
Demographic characteristics of Mexican immigrants													
Sex (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Men	53.9	54.1	55.4	55.1	55.2	55.4	55.2	56.0	55.5	55.0	55.1	53.9	53.6
Women	46.1	45.9	44.6	44.9	44.8	44.6	44.8	44.0	44.5	45.0	44.9	46.1	46.5
Age groups (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
From 0 to 14 years old	9.4	9.3	9.1	8.6	8.6	8.6	7.7	7.3	6.6	6.1	5.5	5.3	4.4
From 15 to 29 years old	32.6	31.4	33.1	31.9	32.3	31.3	30.2	28.6	27.9	25.8	25.0	24.3	21.9
From 30 to 44 years old	36.1	35.6	36.9	37.5	37.4	37.0	37.3	38.1	37.9	38.0	38.7	37.6	38.5
From 45 to 64 years old	17.3	18.8	16.8	17.4	17.3	18.6	20.1	20.8	22.1	24.2	25.0	26.6	28.8
From 65 years or over	4.6	4.9	4.1	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.7	5.1	5.5	5.9	5.9	6.3	6.4
Average age (years)	33.9	34.4	33.6	34.3	34.2	34.5	35.2	35.2	35.8	36.7	37.2	38.6	39.6
State of residence (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
California	47.8	44.5	42.5	39.3	38.3	42.1	39.5	39.5	40.2	39.7	39.9	38.2	37.3
Texas	19.0	21.0	20.3	23.0	21.4	20.3	19.4	19.2	19.5	20.3	20.0	22.5	21.6
Illinois	5.8	5.5	4.9	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.7	5.3	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.6	6.1
Arizona	5.3	4.7	5.6	6.0	6.2	5.5	6.4	5.7	5.8	5.0	5.1	5.0	5.4
Washington	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.9	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.2
New York	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.2
Georgia	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.5	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.1	1.9	2.0
North Carolina	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.6	2.0	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.7	2.2	2.0	1.9
Nevada	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.8
Florida	2.4	3.0	3.5	2.2	2.0	2.4	2.8	3.3	2.5	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.8
Colorado	2.3	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.0	2.2	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.6
New Jersey	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.8	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.2
New Mexico	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.8	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1
Other states	8.6	10.3	10.4	10.5	12.6	12.0	12.6	13.3	12.7	14.8	13.6	12.7	13.8
Period of entry (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Before 1975	17.3	15.5	13.5	13.5	12.3	11.8	10.6	10.3	10.6	10.7	10.3	9.7	8.9
From 1975 to 1985	24.4	22.6	20.9	20.9	19.0	16.6	17.0	15.9	15.9	15.7	15.3	15.3	15.5
From 1986 to 1995	39.2	36.9	35.8	35.8	30.2	29.7	28.9	28.3	27.4	26.6	27.4	27.1	26.4
From 1996 to 2007	19.1	25.0	29.9	29.9	38.5	41.9	43.6	45.5	44.0	44.2	42.8	43.0	43.3
2008 onwards	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	2.1	2.9	4.2	4.9	5.8

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	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Mobility condition in the last year (%)													
Non-migrants	91.6	91.9	91.2	92.3	93.2	89.7	93.1	94.9	95.5	95.6	96.3	97.2	96.4
Internal migrants ¹	4.9	4.7	4.9	5.0	4.4	5.3	4.5	3.4	3.0	3.2	2.8	1.9	2.7
International migrants ²	3.5	3.5	3.9	2.7	2.4	5.0	2.5	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.9
Social characteristic of the Mexican immigrants													
Education³													
Less than 10 grades	56.2	56.7	54.7	54.1	52.7	52.6	51.0	47.0	50.0	49.2	46.0	47.0	47.0
From 10 to 12 grades	29.9	28.7	30.6	31.4	32.9	32.9	34.3	38.0	35.0	35.2	37.2	36.8	37.0
Higher technical	9.6	9.1	9.3	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.9	9.4	9.7	9.9	10.3	9.9
Professional & postgraduate	4.3	5.5	5.4	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.0	5.6	5.9	6.9	5.9	6.1
Citizenship in the U.S. (%)													
U.S. citizen	22.6	22.6	21.4	21.8	21.3	20.4	21.3	21.5	22.7	24.1	25.8	27.0	27.9
Non - U.S. citizen	77.4	77.4	78.6	78.2	78.7	79.6	78.7	78.5	77.3	75.9	74.2	73.0	72.1
Poverty condition⁴ (%)													
Poor	25.7	24.7	24.6	25.4	25.7	26.2	25.7	22.1	24.8	27.1	28.8	29.9	27.7
Not poor	74.3	75.3	75.4	74.6	74.3	73.8	74.3	77.9	75.2	73.0	71.3	70.2	72.3
Type of health coverage (%)													
Public	12.7	12.3	11.7	12.9	12.9	14.1	14.1	12.7	14.1	15.0	16.7	16.0	16.8
Private	33.2	33.1	33.6	32.3	30.3	29.8	29.6	28.3	28.5	28.5	25.5	27.4	26.6
Both	2.0	1.9	1.7	2.2	1.8	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5
None	52.1	52.7	53.0	52.6	55.0	53.4	54.1	56.4	55.4	54.2	55.4	54.3	54.1
Labor characteristics of Mexican immigrants (%)													
Population 15 years old or over (Millions)													
Economically-active pop.	5.0	5.3	6.3	6.5	6.7	6.9	7.2	7.7	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.8
Employed	4.6	4.9	5.8	5.8	6.2	6.5	6.8	7.2	7.0	6.7	6.8	6.8	7.0
Unemployed	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8
Economically-inactive pop.	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5
Weekly hours worked (%)													
34 or less	9.3	9.7	11.6	11.1	10.3	11.0	9.5	10.5	12.4	16.4	20.2	19.7	18.7
From 35 to 44 hours	76.8	75.3	75.2	75.1	76.1	75.2	76.1	75.1	74.8	71.0	68.6	70.0	69.1
45 or more	13.9	14.9	13.2	13.8	13.6	13.8	14.4	14.4	12.8	12.6	11.2	10.4	12.2

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	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Annual wage (U.S. dollars) (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than 10 000	21.0	17.5	17.5	15.0	14.4	13.4	12.8	11.1	11.7	13.0	13.4	12.6	11.9
From 10 000 to 19 999	44.1	42.4	40.0	39.9	40.9	39.9	37.1	34.4	32.5	31.0	34.0	32.8	30.6
From 20 000 to 29 999	20.1	22.0	24.6	24.3	23.9	24.0	26.2	27.5	27.0	25.3	24.3	25.9	26.7
From 30 000 to 39 999	7.8	9.9	9.3	10.7	11.2	11.4	12.4	13.7	13.2	14.5	13.4	13.4	14.4
From 40 000 or more	7.0	8.2	8.7	10.1	9.6	11.3	11.5	13.3	15.6	16.1	14.9	15.4	16.4
Sector of activity (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Primary	12.1	9.5	8.3	4.4	5.0	5.7	4.2	4.0	5.2	5.2	5.5	4.9	4.9
Secondary	36.6	36.5	35.8	35.8	36.1	36.9	39.6	40.6	37.2	33.2	30.9	32.3	31.8
Tertiary	51.2	54.0	55.9	59.8	58.9	57.4	56.2	55.4	57.7	61.7	63.6	62.8	63.3
Industry (%)	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Construction	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	15.8	19.1	21.1	22.5	24.5	22.2	18.2	17.4	18.1	17.0
Leisure and hospitality	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	16.1	14.7	14.5	15.9	14.4	14.4	16.1	15.8	14.7	16.0
Manufacturing	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	19.2	16.7	15.7	16.7	15.4	15.1	16.1	13.8	14.2	14.3
Professional & business services	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	10.0	11.1	11.2	10.2	10.2	11.2	11.3	12.4	12.8	12.8
Wholesale and retail trade	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	12.2	12.6	11.5	10.5	11.0	10.7	10.6	11.3	11.5	10.5
Educational and health services	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	6.7	6.4	6.1	6.7	6.7	7.3	8.5	8.8	9.5	8.3
Other services, excl. government	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	6.1	6.4	6.5	5.5	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.9	6.0	6.3
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	5.4	6.3	6.4	4.9	4.5	5.8	6.0	6.5	5.4	5.9
Transportation and utilities	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	3.5	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.9	3.9	4.1
Financial activities	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.5
Public administration	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1
Mining	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6
Information	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.5

Notes: 1/ It refers to the population that resided, the year prior to the interview, in a county other than the current one.

2/ It refers to the population that resided, the year prior to the interview, in Mexico.

3/ Population 25 years or over.

4/ Methodology for poverty in the U.S. Individuals are classified as below the poverty level using a poverty index adopted by a Federal Inter Agency Committee in 1969, slightly modified in 1981. For more information, refer to <http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/>.

n.a.: not available.

Source: BBVA Research with CONAPO estimations based on the Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS), March 1994-2007 and BBVA Research estimations from Current Population Survey (CPS), March 2008-2012.

Table 14

**Remittances' average total cost for sending US\$200 dollars to top 10 receiving-remittances countries worldwide
 (Cost as % of amount sent)**

Global ranking *	Country	Estimated remittances inflow in 2012 * (Million of US\$)	2009								
			2008	Q1	Q3	Q1	Q3	Q1	Q3	Q1	Q3 p/
1	India	69,349.9	7.9	7.7	7.6	7.5	8.2	7.8	7.8	8.7	8.6
2	China	60,245.5	12.9	13.6	13.0	12.1	11.0	12.3	12.3	12.1	12.3
3	Philippines	24,453.1	8.7	7.4	6.8	5.7	6.2	6.1	6.2	7.0	6.5
4	Mexico	23,219.0	5.8	6.8	5.8	7.4	7.1	6.9	6.0	5.8	5.6
5	Nigeria	20,568.3	8.7	8.2	9.8	8.1	8.0	9.0	10.8	11.2	10.9
6	Egypt	20,515.3	5.5	5.4	6.2	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.3
7	France	19,450.8	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
8	Bangladesh	14,060.1	7.1	4.8	5.1	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.4	4.4
9	Pakistan	14,010.1	7.6	8.0	6.3	4.9	7.0	7.8	7.2	6.0	5.9
10	Germany	13,655.2	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.

Table 15

**Remittances' average total cost for sending US\$200 dollars to top 10 receiving-remittances countries in Latin America and
 the Caribbean (Cost as % of amount sent)**

Global ranking *	Country	Estimated remittances inflow in 2012 * (Million of US\$)	2009								
			2008	Q1	Q3	Q1	Q3	Q1	Q3	Q1	Q3 p/
4	Mexico	23,219.0	5.8	6.8	5.8	7.4	7.1	6.9	6.0	5.8	5.6
25	Brazil	4,935.5	8.8	9.3	8.5	13.7	10.4	9.9	12.8	10.7	12.5
26	Guatemala	4,922.4	6.6	5.8	6.4	6.3	5.8	6.0	5.4	5.7	6.0
29	Colombia	4,109.8	6.7	6.0	5.9	6.9	5.6	4.8	6.6	7.3	7.3
30	El Salvador	3,965.3	4.6	4.1	4.1	4.6	5.0	5.2	4.7	5.3	5.3
35	Dominican Rep.	3,505.2	9.8	7.6	7.8	6.9	6.4	6.0	5.9	6.2	7.4
37	Honduras	2,971.4	4.7	6.0	5.8	4.4	6.7	6.4	5.1	5.7	7.7
39	Peru	2,808.5	10.1	8.2	5.1	4.6	4.5	4.5	5.3	6.4	5.8
42	Ecuador	2,681.5	5.3	5.4	4.3	4.7	5.1	4.6	4.6	5.1	4.6
45	Jamaica	2,157.7	10.6	11.2	9.7	8.9	9.2	8.5	8.8	8.9	8.1

p/ preliminary figures

* According to World Bank estimations

Note: To calculate the average total cost we exclude data where the exchange rate is not transparent and Russia remittance-corridors due to not providing information on exchange rate, since the actual cost may be higher if data were complete. World Bank does not have information on remittance-senders market shares, so the total average cost is calculated as a simple average of the available information, as indicated by the World Bank.

Source: BBVA Research based on World Bank Remittance Prices Worldwide (RPW) and World Bank staff calculation, April 2013.

Table 16

Remittance fee for sending US\$300 from the United States to Mexico (in dollars)

	Chicago	Dallas	Houston	Indianapolis	Los Angeles	Miami	New York	Sacramento	San Jose	Average
2000	11.8	11.9	11.6		11.7	15.6	11.3	10.3		12.0
2001	11.4	11.1	11.1		11.1	14.6	11.1	10.5	11.5	11.5
2002	11.3	11.6	12.0		11.6	11.7	11.2	10.7	11.3	11.4
2003	10.4	10.8	10.8	10.6	10.4	11.0	10.9	10.3	10.3	10.6
2004	10.0	11.1	10.8	10.0	9.9	10.7	10.5	9.6	9.7	10.3
2005	9.5	11.7	11.2	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.0	9.2	9.7	10.1
2006	9.4	11.6	11.5	10.0	10.2	10.2	10.2	8.9	10.1	10.2
2007	9.1	10.9	11.5	10.0	9.5	9.7	9.5	7.6	9.6	9.7
2008	8.0	9.9	11.0	10.0	8.6	8.7	8.1	6.8	8.2	8.8
2009	7.0	9.0	10.4	9.4	7.5	7.4	7.5	5.9	7.4	8.0
2010	5.7	8.0	10.0	8.6	5.9	5.5	6.7	4.9	6.4	6.9
2011	6.5	8.9	10.7	9.5	7.5	7.1	7.9	7.0	7.3	8.0
2012	6.3	9.1	10.8	9.7	7.9	7.6	7.8	7.6	7.6	8.3
2013 p/	6.3	8.8	10.5	10.3	7.8	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7	8.3

p/ 2013 preliminary figures updated on June 2013.

Source: BBVA Research estimations based on PROFECO weekly database

Table 17

Annual Remittance Inflows at the National Level

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 p/
Million dollars										
Total	18,331.7	21,688.3	25,566.8	26,058.8	25,145.0	21,306.3	21,303.9	22,803.0	22,442.9	4,847.4
Electronic transfers	16,228.5	19,667.2	23,854.0	24,802.7	24,113.7	20,547.5	20,583.3	22,228.9	21,857.6	4,713.6
Cash and payment in kind	233.6	273.2	353.2	396.5	432.6	372.6	330.9	367.3	390.5	87.2
Money Orders	1,869.7	1,747.9	1,359.7	859.7	598.6	386.2	389.7	206.8	194.8	46.6
Personal checks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thousands of transactions										
Total	57,013.4	64,921.7	74,184.6	75,651.5	72,627.7	67,109.6	67,535.6	69,860.9	71,622.6	16,467.4
Electronic transfers	52,087.9	60,509.4	70,697.7	73,278.7	70,478.0	65,381.4	65,930.0	68,553.1	70,350.5	16,184.7
Cash and payment in kind	322.7	345.4	642.3	786.9	796.3	861.8	789.4	880.5	878.8	191.5
Money Orders	4,602.8	4,066.9	2,844.6	1,585.9	1,353.3	866.4	816.1	427.3	393.3	91.2
Personal checks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average remittance (dollars)	321.0	333.6	344.4	344.3	346.2	317.6	315.2	326.2	312.9	294.4

Table 18

Annual Remittance Inflows by State (Million Dollars)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 p/
National	18,331.7	21,688.3	25,566.8	26,058.8	25,145.0	21,306.3	21,303.9	22,803.0	22,442.9	4,847.4
Michoacán	2,281.4	2,442.4	2,503.7	2,435.8	2,448.9	2,132.3	2,144.5	2,245.1	2,209.8	493.8
Guanajuato	1,728.0	1,904.8	2,311.2	2,389.0	2,317.7	1,944.9	1,981.3	2,155.8	2,138.7	456.4
Jalisco	1,462.2	1,695.7	1,975.5	1,996.7	1,914.8	1,695.1	1,755.6	1,895.8	1,883.9	410.5
Mexico	1,445.8	1,764.9	2,079.1	2,167.0	2,066.7	1,700.8	1,637.6	1,658.4	1,564.1	331.4
Puebla	1,009.1	1,182.1	1,482.6	1,617.6	1,615.7	1,374.9	1,371.2	1,469.6	1,403.5	314.0
Oaxaca	948.9	1,080.2	1,360.2	1,517.4	1,522.2	1,298.5	1,296.5	1,427.4	1,366.5	282.2
Guerrero	1,018.3	1,174.6	1,455.7	1,489.6	1,435.5	1,200.3	1,201.5	1,262.4	1,231.3	279.9
Veracruz	1,168.1	1,373.5	1,680.8	1,775.7	1,618.3	1,296.3	1,237.4	1,273.1	1,176.2	244.7
Distrito Federal	921.7	1,312.6	1,490.4	1,058.6	1,083.9	965.9	999.3	1,151.9	1,013.7	169.1
San Luis Potosí	469.2	562.3	714.5	778.4	760.8	626.8	629.5	700.8	738.9	158.9
Zacatecas	484.6	540.5	667.7	687.4	681.6	573.3	581.7	625.5	654.6	147.8
Hidalgo	725.6	815.0	982.8	1,092.2	961.0	752.1	715.5	762.7	721.6	142.2
Tamaulipas	284.1	425.3	496.7	516.7	500.5	415.0	402.3	445.3	485.6	122.3
Chiapas	587.5	765.3	940.8	921.2	811.1	609.7	574.5	594.8	572.8	121.9
Baja California	165.0	256.6	302.1	334.6	334.3	322.1	348.0	396.8	465.0	120.5
Morelos	433.2	505.2	588.0	635.4	622.6	548.1	554.9	586.8	561.4	120.3
Sinaloa	374.0	451.1	503.2	523.0	487.7	456.7	470.2	511.8	501.3	112.9
Chihuahua	279.4	389.2	473.9	460.2	474.8	407.8	397.8	419.3	466.9	103.8
Durango	329.7	384.3	428.5	453.1	442.0	374.8	379.1	416.6	431.2	94.1
Querétaro	353.4	405.9	484.1	475.1	436.4	360.2	354.5	383.3	378.7	76.7
Nuevo León	295.9	284.0	342.6	327.1	323.8	293.0	284.0	308.9	340.1	76.3
Sonora	170.4	294.7	326.0	332.3	311.0	278.7	292.0	326.9	326.8	76.0
Nayarit	262.4	302.7	348.2	375.2	376.5	341.6	337.4	356.4	339.6	72.5
Aguascalientes	314.8	322.6	379.4	373.0	332.3	282.2	293.9	306.3	332.7	69.8
Coahuila	180.0	240.8	275.3	293.2	278.4	234.2	234.0	247.0	283.6	64.3
Tlaxcala	185.1	221.1	270.7	303.3	305.2	258.9	258.5	274.5	253.3	48.3
Colima	134.3	165.1	183.1	199.7	184.7	164.8	171.5	183.8	180.2	39.4
Yucatán	75.7	94.1	122.1	136.8	136.1	109.9	112.7	117.8	119.2	28.5
Tabasco	105.3	156.5	187.8	182.8	156.0	114.4	111.3	111.7	111.3	23.9
Quintana Roo	67.5	85.0	99.5	98.5	97.3	85.6	86.8	92.1	93.3	22.9
Campeche	53.3	65.7	82.0	80.4	72.8	55.8	55.1	57.8	55.6	12.2
Baja California Sur	17.8	24.5	28.5	32.0	34.7	31.9	33.7	36.7	41.4	9.7

p/ Preliminary figures accumulated to 2013 Q1
 Source: BBVA Research with figures from Banxico

Table 19

Annual Remittance Inflows at the National Level (Breakdown %)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 p/
Million dollars										
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Electronic transfers	88.5	90.7	93.3	95.2	95.9	96.4	96.6	97.5	97.4	97.2
Cash and payment in kind	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8
Money Orders	10.2	8.1	5.3	3.3	2.4	1.8	1.8	0.9	0.9	1.0
Personal checks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thousands of transactions										
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Electronic transfers	91.4	93.2	95.3	96.9	97.0	97.4	97.6	98.1	98.2	98.3
Cash and payment in kind	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2
Money Orders	8.1	6.3	3.8	2.1	1.9	1.3	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.6
Personal checks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 20

Annual Remittance Inflows by State (Breakdown %)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 p/
National	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Michoacán	12.4	11.3	9.8	9.3	9.7	10.0	10.1	9.8	9.8	10.2
Guanajuato	9.4	8.8	9.0	9.2	9.2	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.5	9.4
Jalisco	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.7	7.6	8.0	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.5
Mexico	7.9	8.1	8.1	8.3	8.2	8.0	7.7	7.3	7.0	6.8
Puebla	5.5	5.5	5.8	6.2	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.5
Oaxaca	5.2	5.0	5.3	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.1	5.8
Guerrero	5.6	5.4	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.8
Veracruz	6.4	6.3	6.6	6.8	6.4	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.2	5.0
Distrito Federal	5.0	6.1	5.8	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.7	5.1	4.5	3.5
San Luis Potosí	2.6	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.3
Zacatecas	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.0
Hidalgo	4.0	3.8	3.8	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	2.9
Tamaulipas	1.5	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.5
Chiapas	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.5
Baja California	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.5
Morelos	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5
Sinaloa	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3
Chihuahua	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.1
Durango	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9
Querétaro	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6
Nuevo León	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6
Sonora	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6
Nayarit	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5
Aguascalientes	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4
Coahuila	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3
Tlaxcala	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0
Colima	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Yucatán	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Tabasco	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Quintana Roo	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
Campeche	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3
Baja California Sur	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

p/ Preliminary figures accumulated to 2013 Q1

Source: BBVA Research with figures from Banxico

Table 21

Monthly Remittance Inflows to Mexico (Million Dollars)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Jan	456.2	655.0	711.0	1,051.3	1,081.9	1,367.6	1,758.3	1,872.9	1,781.7	1,573.0	1,323.8	1,403.2	1,506.3	1,461.9
Feb	447.2	637.7	718.9	979.8	1,171.8	1,428.4	1,823.2	1,856.8	1,859.7	1,810.8	1,553.5	1,651.1	1,788.2	1,587.5
Mar	494.5	718.1	744.5	1,139.1	1,480.2	1,691.6	2,152.8	2,186.5	2,116.3	2,115.1	1,954.8	2,055.9	2,091.7	1,773.0
Apr	498.8	734.8	805.9	1,202.5	1,513.5	1,753.3	2,072.7	2,166.6	2,184.7	1,794.8	1,794.8	1,880.9	2,031.5	1,901.8
May	590.7	798.2	912.2	1,351.0	1,770.4	2,057.3	2,534.6	2,411.8	2,371.6	1,905.5	2,146.2	2,168.5	2,342.5	2,033.9
Jun	541.6	747.8	860.0	1,351.2	1,684.7	1,923.3	2,340.3	2,300.6	2,264.6	1,934.0	1,894.9	2,022.3	2,096.1	
Jul	557.6	796.6	843.1	1,361.4	1,654.4	1,840.3	2,191.6	2,369.5	2,183.2	1,850.2	1,874.4	1,906.7	1,862.7	
Aug	608.1	789.3	849.1	1,401.2	1,786.8	2,059.2	2,334.3	2,412.1	2,097.6	1,799.4	1,957.7	2,143.9	1,889.7	
Sep	568.5	772.1	860.6	1,365.5	1,586.8	1,886.0	2,141.0	2,186.1	2,113.8	1,747.2	1,719.0	2,086.0	1,661.6	
Oct	559.5	792.8	848.3	1,391.0	1,529.9	1,862.3	2,316.5	2,367.6	2,637.7	1,696.0	1,731.0	1,912.6	1,771.3	
Nov	583.1	693.8	741.4	1,203.7	1,506.2	1,887.0	1,962.8	1,958.5	1,752.2	1,510.8	1,631.9	1,785.9	1,692.3	
Dec	666.8	759.0	919.4	1,341.1	1,565.1	1,932.1	1,938.7	1,969.8	1,781.9	1,569.5	1,721.8	1,786.0	1,704.4	
Total	6,572.7	8,895.3	9,814.4	15,138.7	18,331.7	21,688.3	25,566.8	26,058.8	25,145.0	21,306.3	21,303.9	22,803.0	22,438.3	

Monthly Remittance Inflows to Mexico (Annual % Change)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Jan	14.2	43.6	8.6	47.8	2.9	26.4	28.6	6.5	-4.9	-11.7	-15.8	6.0	7.4	-2.9
Feb	15.0	42.6	12.7	36.3	19.6	21.9	27.6	1.8	0.2	-2.6	-14.2	6.3	8.3	-11.2
Mar	6.4	45.2	3.7	53.0	29.9	14.3	27.3	1.6	-3.2	-0.1	-7.6	5.2	1.7	-15.2
Apr	6.3	47.3	9.7	49.2	25.9	15.8	18.2	4.5	0.8	-17.8	0.0	4.8	8.0	-6.4
May	3.4	35.1	14.3	48.1	31.0	16.2	23.2	-4.8	-1.7	-19.7	12.6	1.0	8.0	-13.2
Jun	3.8	38.1	15.0	57.1	24.7	14.2	21.7	-1.7	-1.6	-14.6	-2.0	6.7	3.7	
Jul	10.1	42.9	5.8	61.5	21.5	11.2	19.1	8.1	-7.9	-15.2	1.3	1.7	-2.3	
Aug	14.3	29.8	7.6	65.0	27.5	15.2	13.4	3.3	-13.0	-14.2	8.8	9.5	-11.9	
Sep	15.9	35.8	11.5	58.7	16.2	18.9	13.5	2.1	-3.3	-17.3	-1.6	21.4	-20.3	
Oct	17.9	41.7	7.0	64.0	10.0	21.7	24.4	2.2	11.4	-35.7	2.1	10.5	-7.4	
Nov	16.2	19.0	6.9	62.3	25.1	25.3	4.0	-0.2	-10.5	-13.8	8.0	9.4	-5.2	
Dec	13.5	13.8	21.1	45.9	16.7	23.5	0.3	1.6	-9.5	-11.9	9.7	3.7	-4.6	
Total	11.2	35.3	10.3	54.2	21.1	18.3	17.9	1.9	-3.5	-15.3	0.0	7.0	-1.6	

12-month Remittance Inflows to Mexico (Million Dollars)

Jan	5,966.2	6,771.5	8,951.3	10,154.7	15,169.3	18,617.4	22,079.0	25,681.5	25,967.6	24,936.3	21,057.2	21,383.2	22,906.1	22,393.9
Feb	6,024.5	6,962.0	9,032.5	10,415.6	15,361.3	18,874.0	22,473.8	25,715.0	25,970.5	24,887.3	20,799.8	21,480.8	23,043.3	22,193.2
Mar	6,054.0	7,185.6	9,059.0	10,810.1	15,702.4	19,085.4	22,935.1	25,748.7	25,900.3	24,886.1	20,639.6	21,581.9	23,079.1	21,874.5
Apr	6,083.7	7,421.5	9,130.1	11,206.8	16,013.4	19,325.2	23,254.5	25,842.6	25,918.5	24,496.2	20,639.6	21,668.0	23,229.7	21,744.9
May	6,102.9	7,629.0	9,244.0	11,645.5	16,432.9	19,612.1	23,731.8	25,719.8	25,878.3	24,030.1	20,880.3	21,690.3	23,403.7	21,436.2
Jun	6,122.5	7,835.3	9,356.2	12,136.7	16,766.4	19,850.6	24,148.8	25,680.1	25,842.3	23,699.5	20,841.1	21,817.7	23,477.5	
Jul	6,173.5	8,074.3	9,402.7	12,655.0	17,059.4	20,036.6	24,500.1	25,857.9	25,656.0	23,366.6	20,865.3	21,850.0	23,433.5	
Aug	6,249.4	8,255.5	9,462.5	13,207.1	17,445.0	20,309.0	24,775.2	25,935.8	25,341.4	23,068.4	21,023.7	22,036.2	23,179.2	
Sep	6,327.5	8,459.1	9,551.0	13,712.0	17,666.3	20,608.1	25,030.2	25,980.9	25,269.1	22,701.8	20,995.4	22,403.2	22,754.9	
Oct	6,412.5	8,692.4	9,606.5	14,254.7	17,805.3	20,940.5	25,484.4	26,032.1	25,539.2	21,760.1	21,030.5	22,584.8	22,613.5	
Nov	6,493.6	8,803.1	9,654.1	14,717.0	18,107.7	21,321.2	25,560.3	26,027.8	25,332.8	21,518.7	21,151.6	22,738.8	22,519.9	
Dec	6,572.7	8,895.3	9,814.4	15,138.7	18,331.7	21,688.3	25,566.8	26,058.8	25,145.0	21,306.3	21,303.9	22,803.0	22,438.3	

12-month Remittance Inflows to Mexico (Annual % Change)

Jan	5.7	13.5	32.2	13.4	49.4	22.7	18.6	16.3	1.1	-4.0	-15.6	1.5	7.1	-2.2
Feb	6.3	15.6	29.7	15.3	47.5	22.9	19.1	14.4	1.0	-4.2	-16.4	3.3	7.3	-3.7
Mar	6.1	18.7	26.1	19.3	45.3	21.5	20.2	12.3	0.6	-3.9	-17.1	4.6	6.9	-5.2
Apr	6.1	22.0	23.0	22.7	42.9	20.7	20.3	11.1	0.3	-5.5	-15.7	5.0	7.2	-6.4
May	5.5	25.0	21.2	26.0	41.1	19.3	21.0	8.4	0.6	-7.1	-13.1	3.9	7.9	-8.4
Jun	5.5	28.0	19.4	29.7	38.1	18.4	21.7	6.3	0.6	-8.3	-12.1	4.7	7.6	
Jul	6.2	30.8	16.5	34.6	34.8	17.5	22.3	5.5	-0.8	-8.9	-10.7	4.7	7.2	
Aug	6.6	32.1	14.6	39.6	32.1	16.4	22.0	4.7	-2.3	-9.0	-8.9	4.8	5.2	
Sep	7.7	33.7	12.9	43.6	28.8	16.7	21.5	3.8	-2.7	-10.2	-7.5	6.7	1.6	
Oct	8.8	35.6	10.5	48.4	24.9	17.6	21.7	2.1	-1.9	-14.8	-3.4	7.4	0.1	
Nov	9.4	35.6	9.7	52.4	23.0	17.7	19.9	1.8	-2.7	-15.1	-1.7	7.5	-1.0	
Dec	11.2	35.3	10.3	54.2	21.1	18.3	17.9	1.9	-3.5	-15.3	0.0	7.0	-1.6	

Source: BBVA Research with figures from Banxico

Table 22

Intensity of Migration and Remittance Inflows Indicators, by State

State	Households in 2000				Households in 2010				Remittance dependency indicator 2010*	Remittance dependency degree**
	Receiving remittances (%)	With immigrant in US in the previous five years (%)	With circular immigrant in US in the previous five years (%)	With returnee migrant from US in the previous five years (%)	Receiving remittances (%)	With immigrant in US in the previous five years (%)	With circular immigrant in US in the previous five years (%)	With returnee migrant from US in the previous five years (%)		
National	4.4	4.1	0.9	0.8	3.6	1.9	0.9	2.3	2.3	
Guerrero	7.9	6.8	0.8	1.1	6.6	3.2	1.0	3.5	14.6	Very high
Michoacán	11.4	10.4	2.8	2.3	9.3	4.4	2.0	4.9	9.4	Very high
Oaxaca	4.1	4.8	0.6	0.7	4.9	4.1	0.9	3.1	9.3	Very high
Hidalgo	5.1	7.1	1.6	0.9	4.3	3.5	1.6	4.1	8.2	Very high
Zacatecas	13.0	12.2	3.3	2.5	11.0	4.5	2.3	5.7	6.9	Very high
Nayarit	9.6	6.8	2.0	2.0	9.1	2.1	2.3	4.4	6.0	Very high
Morelos	6.4	7.5	1.3	1.1	5.4	2.5	1.1	3.6	5.3	Very high
Tlaxcala	2.2	2.7	0.5	0.4	2.6	2.4	1.2	1.8	5.1	High
Puebla	3.3	4.0	0.5	0.7	3.8	3.0	1.0	2.1	4.4	High
Guanajuato	9.2	9.6	2.2	1.6	7.7	5.3	2.3	4.3	4.3	High
San Luis Potosí	8.2	7.4	1.3	1.2	6.6	3.1	1.3	3.3	3.7	High
Durango	9.7	7.3	1.8	1.6	6.5	2.4	1.3	3.4	3.3	High
Colima	7.3	5.6	1.4	2.1	5.2	1.8	1.1	4.2	3.3	High
Chiapas	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.1	1.1	1.1	0.5	0.9	3.3	High
Aguascalientes	6.7	6.7	2.7	1.5	4.8	2.6	1.6	3.3	2.8	Medium
Veracruz	2.7	3.2	0.5	0.2	2.5	1.8	0.8	2.0	2.7	Medium
Sinaloa	4.6	3.6	0.9	0.6	3.3	1.0	0.7	1.9	2.4	Medium
Querétaro	3.7	4.8	1.4	0.7	3.3	3.0	1.6	2.6	2.1	Medium
Mexico	2.1	2.6	0.6	0.3	1.5	1.0	0.6	1.1	2.0	Medium
Baja California	4.0	2.4	0.4	2.3	3.7	1.1	0.5	4.2	1.5	Low
Tamaulipas	3.6	3.0	0.6	0.7	3.0	1.2	0.7	2.5	1.4	Low
Chihuahua	4.3	3.7	1.0	1.3	4.4	1.7	0.7	2.8	1.4	Low
Sonora	3.2	1.6	0.3	0.9	2.7	1.1	0.7	2.9	1.3	Low
Jalisco	7.7	6.5	1.8	1.7	5.4	2.2	1.3	3.0	1.2	Low
Yucatán	1.4	1.0	0.2	0.2	1.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.8	Very low
Coahuila	3.4	2.2	0.8	0.7	2.4	0.9	0.5	1.5	0.8	Very low
Distrito Federal	1.7	1.6	0.4	0.3	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.7	Very low
Quintana Roo	1.0	0.7	0.2	0.2	1.2	0.5	0.3	1.0	0.7	Very low
B. California Sur	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.6	1.6	0.5	0.4	2.5	0.6	Very low
Nuevo León	2.5	1.9	0.7	0.6	1.3	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.4	Very low
Tabasco	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3	Very low
Campeche	1.0	0.9	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.5	0.3	1.0	0.1	Very low

Note: For 2010, CONAPO estimated migration intensity indicators by house. To make data comparable between 2000 and 2010, for this last year was estimated information directly from databases.

* Remittances / GDP*100. Preliminary figures

** Classification by BBVA Research. The cutoff points were established based on standard deviations in the sample.

Source: For 2000, CONAPO estimation based on the sample of ten percent of the XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000. For 2010, BBVA Research estimations based on the sample of ten percent of Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010. For dependency index, BBVA Research based on INEGI and Banxico.

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