

# Trends in international banking and regulatory challenges

Santiago Fernández de Lis

Chief Economist for Financial Systems and Regulation

OECD Experts Meeting on Financial Services

Paris, November 30<sup>th</sup>

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## 1. Regulation and global banking

### 2. The trend towards fragmentation

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### 4. Banking resolution: a key concern in cross-border banking activities

## Section 1

# Regulation and global banking

The strengthening of regulation is necessary, but its wide scope creates uncertainty on the overall impact . Challenging environment for global banks

	Increase banks solvency	Mitigate system's complexity/risks	Minimize taxpayers' fiscal burden
Basel III	●	●	
SIFIs	●	●	
Crisis Management		●	●
Structural reforms		●	●
Effective supervision		●	●
Macroprudential		●	●
OTC derivatives	●	●	
Shadow banking		●	
Rating Agencies			●
Financial taxation			●


## Section 1

# Regulation and global banking

- Basel harmonization based on minimum levels ...
- ... only works in the good times, when there is a race to the bottom in regulation...
- ... but not in the bad times, when there is a race to the top
- Risk of exacerbating pro-cyclicality
- Asymmetric market discipline and gold-plating

## Core capital ratio (%)

Source: BBVA Research based on BIS



## Section 1

# Regulation and global banking: Impact on EMEs

- EMEs affected by reform in home and host countries-
- Retrenchment of global banks → risks for **financial inclusion** in EMEs

## Capital Requirements

- Could worsen deleveraging and increase the costs of global banks that operate in EMEs
- Trade finance is penalized by Basel III

## Liquidity Requirements

- Liquidity ratios particularly difficult to implement in EMEs
- Credit rating could penalize sovereign debt of EMEs in consolidated requirements

## SIBs Regulation (domestic and global)

- Could penalize the subsidiary model vs. branch model
- Coherence between global and local frameworks is not ensured

## Volker Rule (US)

- Extraterritoriality
- Effects on liquidity of non-US sovereign debt,

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
## Section 2

# The trend towards fragmentation

- **Last decade: increase of globalization.** Internationally active foreign banks gained importance, especially in LATAM and Eastern Europe ...
- ... but recent signs of a **reversal of this trend**, partly as a result of the perception of public support and the cost of banking crises: temporary or structural? Regional differences


## Market share of foreign banks

Source: IMF



## Asset share of foreign banks \*

Source: IMF



\* Claessens, S. and van Horen, N. (2012), "Foreign Banks: Trends, Impact and Financial Stability", IMF Working Paper No.12/10


## Section 2

# The trend towards fragmentation

The fragmentation is **more worrying in the Eurozone**: re-nationalization of financial markets puts at risk the euro


European Banks: Average exposures to EU members (dollars)

Source: BIS



Collateral used in credit operations (Euro system) (%)

Source: ECB



## 3 Triggers

- 1 Market-driven segmentation
- 2 Rating agencies
- 3 Regulation (mostly moral suasion)

After LTRO, rise in domestic interbank transactions but drop in cross-border



## Section 2

# The trend towards fragmentation

Two things need to be fixed for global banks to recover their role:

1. Macro prudential policies available to protect EMEs from bubbles originated from excess capital inflows
2. Cross border resolution mechanisms that permit to deal with the failure of global SIBs

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## Section 3

## Macprudential policies and capital controls

- Recent focus of regulatory debates, but **more solid analytical framework** is needed to design adequate policies
- More interesting experience in EMEs

- **Asia: successful** (but intrusive) **macroprudential policies**
- **Eastern Europe: mixed results.** Late response by the authorities in some cases
- **Latam:** more recent experience, results to be seen

### Eastern Europe: vast increase in credit growth

- Massive foreign lending through banking system
- Mostly channeled to the real estate sector.
- Increasing external indebtedness
- Foreign banks relying on centralized funding by parent institution played a key role
- FX mortgages particularly risky. Several measures adopted, but in some countries too late


### Asia: successful macroprudential policies:

- LTV and DTI limits used to limit housing booms
- Countercyclical buffers
- Dynamic provisions
- Consistency of the overall policy setting (monetary, fiscal and macroprudential)
- No reliance on foreign indebtedness
- Lessons from Asian crisis were learned

## Section 3

# Macprudential policies and capital controls

**Latam:** very active use of macroprudential policies in recent years. Results to be seen



\* Includes, for example, FX intervention, limits to foreign investment by pension funds, limits to foreign currency purchase by pension funds, etc.

- Macroprudential policies are necessary to deal with credit bubbles
- Important (but difficult) to distinguish some macroprudential policies from capital controls
- Right calibration and early adoption are key

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## Section 4

# Resolution is key

- **Recent cases of cross-border banking crises raise concerns and provide a justification for cross-border barriers ...**
- **... especially when huge public funds are injected**



## Section 4

# Resolution is key

- **Cross- border resolution seen as too complicated. No agreed burden-sharing mechanisms**
- **Need to clarify rules for resolution of SIBs**
  - **Coordination between home-host supervisors and burden sharing agreements**
  - **Supervisory Colleges and Crisis Managements Groups**
- **Recent progress:**
  - **Towards a resolution framework. Bail in instead of taxpayers money**
  - **Recovery and resolution plans (RRPs)**
  - **Recent FSB paper: significant progress towards an operational resolution framework. Two models:**
    - **Single Point of Entry (SPE)**
    - **Multiple Point of Entry (MPE)**
  - **Decentralized model of stand-alone subsidiaries more resilient and less prone to contagion (Latam vs CEE).**

## Key Messages

- The ongoing **regulatory reform is necessary** to avoid a repeat of the international financial crisis. The **proliferation of reforms and the decreasing harmonization in implementation creates, however, uncertainty over the overall impact.**
- Although designed as a **gradual** process, the market pressure is introducing a bias towards **frontloading adoption**. This can have **unintended procyclical effects** in a context of vulnerability in significant segments of the global financial system.
- **Emerging markets** are subject to the combined impact of reforms in home and host countries which implies a **risk for the progress in financial inclusion.**
- The **crisis and the reform are leading to a fragmentation** of global financial systems, although with different regional impact. This fragmentation is **particularly worrying for the Eurozone.**
- This environment is challenging for **global banks**. For them to continue playing a role, **progress is necessary in two areas:**
  - Sound **macroprudential policies** should protect national financial systems from bubbles, in particular those resulting from huge capital inflows. It is important to **distinguish** these policies from others unduly **limiting international capital flows.**
  - Progress in **cross-border resolution** of international banks is key to limit contagion and for a fair burden sharing of international crises. The **decentralized model** of stand alone subsidiaries has proven **more resilient** from the point of view of global financial stability.



# Thanks!

Santiago Fernández de Lis

Chief Economist for Financial Systems and Regulation

[sfernandezdelis@bbva.com](mailto:sfernandezdelis@bbva.com)

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