Published on Monday, November 16, 2026 | Updated on Monday, November 16, 2026
Global | Inflation and interest rates with greater financing needs
The rise in long-term interest rates is not only due to inflation, but also to global megatrends. Geopolitics, the energy transition, AI, and demographics are increasing the financing needs of the public and private sectors, putting upward pressure on real interest rates.
Key points
- Key points:
- Increased geopolitical fragmentation raises the risk premium and investment needs in defense, energy, and technology to ensure security, pushing interest rates upward.
- The energy transition and the development of artificial intelligence require substantial investments in infrastructure, networks, and technology, increasing the demand for loanable funds and raising real rates.
- Demographics have an ambiguous effect: rising life expectancy can encourage savings, but an aging population increases public spending on pensions and healthcare, which can drive up interest rates.
- Public financing needs are growing to cover defense, energy transition, and aging-related services, while central banks reduce their demand for bonds through quantitative tightening.
Since 2020, and with particular intensity in 2026, long-term interest rates have been rising globally compared to the low levels of the previous decade, reaching highs not seen in the last three decades. To understand what has happened, it is useful to analyze the two components of nominal rates: inflation expectations and the real interest rate. In the years following the pandemic, the explanation for the increase in nominal rates was rising inflation, resulting from disruptions in global production chains, excess demand over supply derived from expansionary fiscal policies, and rising commodity prices, especially as a consequence of the invasion of Ukraine. However, the evidence from these years suggests that this is not just about an increase in inflation expectations.
Long-term interest rates are influenced by expectations regarding the megatrends to which the global economy is being subjected, among which geopolitics, the energy transition, new technologies and artificial intelligence, and demographics stand out.
The increase in fragmentation and geopolitical uncertainty is one of the forces driving up interest rates. On one hand, the risk premium, which is one of the components of real rates, increases as the perception of greater uncertainty rises. On the other, when companies or governments prioritize security over efficiency—doubling suppliers, maintaining larger inventories, or financing their own capabilities in defense, energy, and technology—they not only generate higher inflation but also need to meet greater capital requirements and increases in public spending and debt, further pressuring the real component of rates. Meanwhile, tariffs, export controls, competition for strategic raw materials, or conflicts in fossil fuel production or transit zones drive up supply costs, which tends to push both inflation and real rates upward as long as demand remains strong.
The energy transition poses a similar adjustment, albeit with different effects over time. It requires investments in non-greenhouse gas-emitting energy, grids, storage, and infrastructure. To the increased capital demand of the energy transition, we must also add the investments needed to adapt to the effects of climate change. While the energy supply is being transformed, carbon costs, bottlenecks, or a premature reduction in fossil fuel production investments can raise prices and their volatility, pressuring the inflation component of nominal rates. As the energy transition progresses, innovation in clean technologies may reduce the cost of energy in the long term and moderate inflation. In any case, inaction in the face of the climate challenge is not an optimal strategy nor does it reduce costs; rather, it increases them significantly, shifting them to the future.
For its part, artificial intelligence has two effects with different time horizons. In the present, it demands significant investments in data centers, semiconductor production, grid expansion, and electricity generation, which require enormous volumes of financing and increases in productive capacity. This expansion of demand raises real rates due to the greater need for loanable funds and, if supply does not grow at the same pace, adds pressure on prices, which is reflected in inflation. Over a broader time horizon, as its adoption becomes widespread and productivity increases, it will allow for more production at lower costs, reducing inflation. At the same time, higher productivity growth raises real rates by increasing the profitability of investment. The final result for interest rates will depend on our societies' ability to increase savings, on one hand, and to realize investment opportunities in new technologies, on the other.
Of the megatrends we are analyzing, demographics present the most ambiguous results for long-term interest rates and divide the opinion of economists. On one hand, higher life expectancy incentivizes saving more for retirement and to cope with longevity risk, containing consumption and inflation. On the other hand, the greater amount of loanable funds resulting from savings puts downward pressure on real rates. For years, this scenario has been the most accepted, being termed the "Japanization" of economies. But there is another view, defended by Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan, which holds that aging also reduces the working-age population and increases spending needs on pensions, healthcare, and long-term care. When households age, they begin to spend their accumulated savings, pushing real rates upward, and the State also finds itself needing to cover a growing portion of spending through the issuance of public debt, the effect of which is an additional upward push on real rates. If the perception of public debt unsustainability also increases, the risk premiums demanded by investors rise, which is a third upward factor. Therefore, it is not easy to determine the consequence of this megatrend a priori, as the final result for interest rates will depend on the preponderance of these two forces, which are heavily influenced by changes in retirement age, employment rates of senior citizens, migration flows, effects on productivity, and the design of the welfare state.
Public financing needs are added to those of the private sector in the face of all the aforementioned changes. Governments must finance growing spending needs in defense, investments in energy transition, and services associated with aging. Meanwhile, we see how technology companies increasingly turn to debt markets to sustain their investments. At the same time, some major buyers of long-term bonds have reduced their demand. Central banks have moved from the quantitative easing of the previous decade to the quantitative tightening of this one, as a response to changes in the inflation scenario. Large sovereign wealth and pension funds have changed the composition of their portfolios. If global savings have become more price-sensitive, long-term debt issuers must offer a higher return to place it, even if long-term inflation expectations remain anchored.
Unless the risks of an economic crisis materialize (for example, a fiscal crisis or, alternatively, a financial one following a disorderly correction in stock markets), the environment of higher long-term interest rates will continue in the coming years. This does not necessarily mean a brake on economic growth. On the contrary. Everything will depend on which forces end up dominating. Productivity gains, particularly those that can be generated by the diffusion of artificial intelligence and new technologies, will be decisive in increasing supply and absorbing new investment needs. Sustainable public finances, capable of financing growing needs more efficiently without deteriorating the confidence of those who buy their debt, will also be key.
|
30-YEAR PUBLIC DEBT INTEREST RATES |
5-YEAR, 5-YEAR FORWARD INFLATION SWAP OF THE US AND EURO AREA (%) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: BBVA Research based on Haver. |
Source: BBVA Research based on Bloomberg. |
Press article. Published in Actualidad Económica (El Mundo) on November 15, 2026.
Authors
Topics
Tags
Was this information useful?